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ABSTRACT
Has corporate law and its bundles of fiduciary obligations become
irrelevant? Over the last thirty years, the American public corporation 
has undergone a profound metamorphosis, transforming itself from a 
business with dispersed ownership to one whose ownership is highly
concentrated in the hands of sophisticated financial institutions.
Corporate law has not been immutable to these changes. Current 
doctrine now accords to a shareholder vote two effects: first, the vote
satisfies a statutory mandate that shareholders approve a deal, and
second and significantly, the vote insulates the transaction and its actors 
from any claim of misconduct incident to the approved transaction. 
This Article takes issue with the courts and commentators who have
so elevated the impact of shareholder approval to insulate misconduct. 
We develop why it is not reasonable to believe that the shareholders’ 
competencies extend to adjudging managerial misconduct, why that
conclusion is inconsistent with other modern corporate law 
developments, and why such shareholder ratification is likely both 
coerced and poorly considered. We also point out that the position of
courts and commentators who pronounce the death of corporate 
fiduciary law is deeply qualified by the deep conflicts of interest 
institutional investors face when voting as well as the very real threat
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that today’s ecology that supports shareholder activism is likely to
change so that the voice of the discontented shareholder will be at least 
more muted in the future.  
Finally, we provide empirical support that there is a very large
thumb on the scale that pushes all deals toward approval, regardless of 
any allegations of wrongdoing. We observe substantial ownership 
changes at target corporations, sometimes as high as 40 to 50 percent of
their stock, from long-term investors to hedge funds upon the
announcement of a deal and before the consummation of the 
transaction with a shareholder vote. This change reflects the merger 
arbitrageurs’ actions. We further show that this change in ownership
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of 
merger deals garnering the required shareholder approval. 
We conclude that the Delaware courts need to rethink their
obsession with the shareholder vote, renounce the current doctrinal 
trends that are taking them in the wrong direction, and return to their 
historic role of evaluating whether directors have satisfied their
fiduciary duties in M&A transactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[T]he long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid the 
uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the
disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to 
decide on the economic merits of a transaction for themselves. There 
are sound reasons for this policy. When the real parties in interest— 
the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the
ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive
standard of review promises more costs to stockholders in the form of 
litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms
of benefits to them. The reason for that is tied to the core rationale of
the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned
to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility
to having them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-
makers with more information (in the case of directors) or an actual 
economic stake in the outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested 
stockholders). In circumstances, therefore, where the stockholders 
have had the voluntary choice to accept or reject a transaction, the 
business judgment rule standard of review is the presumptively 
correct one and best facilitates wealth creation through the corporate
form.1 
The above quote sets forth the most important development in
corporate law in this still very new century.2 Corwin v. KKR Financial 
1. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015) (footnote omitted).
 2. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 23:8 (3d 
ed. 2010) (noting that “great[] significance” arises from the twin contributions of allowing
shareholder approval to supplant enhanced scrutiny that normally applies in Revlon-type settings
and allowing the mandated vote used to accomplish that transaction also to constitute ratification
of the board’s conduct); 1A MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 11.02 (2018) (calling Corwin “an important ruling”) (on file with authors);
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON & RANDALL S. THOMAS, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s
Takeover Standards, in  THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 29–43 (Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (reviewing the decline in Delaware
judicial scrutiny of M&A transactions, which culminated in Corwin’s broad embrace of the 
cleansing effect of shareholder approval of the transaction); Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of
Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 192 (2019)
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Holdings LLC3 addresses allegations that the directors breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to pursue a variety of steps to seek better 
merger terms.4 Without considering the substantive merits of this 
claim, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the case solely on the
basis that the merger garnered majority shareholder support when they 
voted on the transaction.5 Some, including the members of the Corwin
court, may well believe there are reasons not to be surprised by this 
result; they see Corwin as the natural culmination of the corporate 
governance movement that began half a century earlier.6 They can so 
view Corwin as it squarely prefers governance mechanisms—in this 
case the shareholder vote—and its attendant sense of accountability on
the part of managers over a costly and unpredictable resort to the 
courts to address potential agency costs.7 Indeed, it is such a view of 
governance over litigation that elevates the significance of Corwin, as 
it marks not just a natural extension of the trajectory of the modern 
corporate governance movement but likely its ultimate reach. 
Moreover, the decision is by the most important court for corporate 
matters—the Delaware Supreme Court—thus directly affecting the 
(“Corwin has drastically limited the ability of plaintiffs to pursue post-closing fiduciary duty
claims against boards of directors in M&A transactions . . . .”); Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 603, 603–06 (2018) (naming Corwin as one of the important developments reducing the
availability of shareholder suits challenging deals); Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat From
Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers 30 (Mar. 3, 2019) (Working Paper) (on file with author) (arguing that
Corwin represents a dramatic development in Delaware law).
3. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
 4. Id. at 306.
 5. Id. at 312–14. Our focus in this Article is the meaning, and hence relevance, of 
shareholder votes in deal transactions. This necessarily implicates the soundness of Corwin’s 
holding. What we develop here transcends Corwin by challenging the broader assumptions of 
corporate law, such as the role of a shareholder vote in cleansing self-dealing transactions that we
will discuss later. For a close analysis of how poorly Corwin fits within corporate law and the 
numerous significant questions it creates, see generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Cracking the Corwin
Conundrum and Other Mysteries Regarding Shareholder Approval of Mergers and Acquisitions
(Sept. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252264
[https://perma.cc/SZN3-A73U].
 6. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law:
Searching for the Optimal Balance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 871, 887 
(Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (quoting and endorsing the 
Corwin court’s description of the decision as aligned with “the long-standing principle of 
Delaware law”). 
7. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
263, 286–87 (2019) (noting that the shift in composition from retail to institutional ownership
renders resort to the courts to enforce corporate norms less important as institutional investors— 
sophisticated, repeat players—can address substantive matters and resort to courts only for
procedural matters). 
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governance of about two-thirds of all public firms8 and influencing the 
corporate jurisprudence of other courts. 
In this Article, we question the cleansing effect that should follow 
shareholder approval. We closely examine shareholder consent within
the corporate setting and make the case that permitting a shareholder
vote to cleanse misconduct—as Corwin does—not only 
misunderstands the meaning of consent but also stands many corporate
governance developments of the last fifty years on their head.
To set the stage for our analysis, we note that it is undoubtedly 
true that our corporate governance system has evolved greatly over the
past fifty years. Today, the core focus of the modern corporate
governance movement is to establish within public companies a system 
of independent oversight of the full-time management of the firm. In 
one of the great social developments of the last half century, public 
companies morphed rather quickly from having boards dominated by 
corporate insiders to having a majority of the board members being
financially independent of the senior officers; now boards are 
comprised almost entirely of independent directors.9 This development 
coincided with the emergence of financial institutions as a potential
forceful voice for shareholder-centric views; this voice grew in force as 
the equity ownership grew across public companies generally and as
ownership of large public companies became concentrated among
8. Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, For Corporate Litigation, Delaware Is Still the
First State, in  THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 2018, at 7, 7 (12th ed. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3400258 [https://perma.cc/SVJ3-LQPV]. 
9. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007)
(describing the trend and explaining its existence in terms of the interaction between the embrace
of enhancing shareholder value as the primary goal of corporate governance and an improved
information environment so that firms were driven to improve shareholder wealth rather than
accede to wishes of their executives). This movement reflects the underlying belief that in public
companies, where ownership is not only separated from management but also where owners can
face a formidable collective action problem, boards of directors can provide the necessary
oversight of management’s stewardship but must be financially independent of management to
achieve this objective. See, e.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01(a) & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (recommending that at least a majority of the board of large public
companies not have a significant relationship with senior managers); MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS § 11 (1976) (describing the
importance of the monitoring role of directors and how that role requires financial independence
of a critical mass of board members). 
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financial institutions.10 Institutional influence has been greatly 
enhanced by multiple developments that enable them to coordinate 
their focus: regulatory dispensations so that their public statements 
regarding their views are no longer a regulated utterance;11 the 
evolution of the proxy advisory industry;12 and the rise of activist
investors who regularly tee up proposals for institutions to express 
their support for actions that increase shareholder value.13 
Despite these changes, institutional investors sometimes feel that 
boards—although technically independent of management—are
nonetheless not sufficiently shareholder focused. One important 
reason for this is that regulatory definitions of independence produced 
by the corporate governance movement are nonetheless porous.14 In
10. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91–93 (2017) (collecting data on the concentration
of institutional ownership among very large firms); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim,
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4–5 (Aug. 21, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2147757 [https://perma.cc/KE39-9G39] 
(citing literature on the increasing share of equity ownership among financial institutions and
confirming the existence of this trend).
 11. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992)
(codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (liberalizing the announcements that will not be
deemed a “proxy solicitation,” such as public announcements by shareholders about how they
will vote on a matter before the stockholders and offering a voting recommendation by someone,
for example, a proxy advisor, who does not solicit proxies); see also Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy 
Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate 
Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (1993) (providing close analysis of the scope of the 1992 
amendments to the proxy rules against cases and regulatory provisions that prevailed before the 
adoption of the reforms).
12. Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an
Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1397 (2014).
 13. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013)
(making the case that activist investors are governance intermediaries because they formulate
convincing business strategies that institutional shareholders are “rationally reticent” to initiate).
14. Just as case law fails to reach social and psychological forces that erode a director’s ability
to evaluate a fellow director or the firm’s CEO critically, see, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1051 (Del. 2004) (holding that a director is independent to judge claims against a company’s CEO
even though the director has had long-standing, extensive social involvement with the CEO),
standard regulatory provisions defining independence focus on financial dependence and not a 
range of social and psychological connections that can compromise a director’s judgment, see, e.g.,
NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2013) (listing financial,
commercial, and familial considerations that can render one not independent but not listing any 
social considerations). More generally, the collegiality of the board necessarily allows social and
psychological forces to invite board members to tilt toward management. See generally James D. 
Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985) (analyzing social-
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this regard, one significant corporate governance development has 
been majority-vote bylaws that condition a director serving her newly 
won term on that director garnering at least a majority of the votes
cast.15 Even this development can be seen as not nearly as empowering 
to shareholders as their power to nominate individuals to stand for 
election. Hence, the most recent success of institutional investors is the
increasing acceptance by corporations of processes empowering 
shareholders to nominate some of the director candidates for 
election.16 Equally significant is that the well-received practice today is
for directors to be elected annually so that they are more accountable 
to shareholders, hence the cascade of shareholder votes the last few 
years declassifying boards by amending their articles of incorporation 
or bylaws.17 These developments all have a unifying focus: installing 
individuals on the board of directors who are more independent of
management and more aligned with shareholder interests.  
The social changes making up this corporate governance 
movement were reflected in judicial holdings as well, most prominently
in Delaware. In what might be considered the Golden Age of corporate 
psychological mechanisms among independent directors that generate biases protecting fellow
board members against legal sanctions). 
15. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1010–11 (2010)
[hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs] (describing the rapid rise of majority-vote
provisions among large public companies).
 16. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 127–32, 
136–55 (2014) (concluding that the right to nominate directors arises from the statutory power of
shareholders to raise proper business at the annual meeting of shareholders and hence can only 
narrowly be circumscribed by the articles of incorporation or bylaws); Robert C. Pozen,
Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95,
96–99 (2003) (proposing that the SEC employ a cost-benefit framework commonly utilized by
institutional investors to evaluate proposed rule changes increasing shareholder participation in 
the nomination of directors). 
17. In 2008, only 16 percent of S&P 100 Companies had a staggered board, whereas in 2003, 
44 percent of them had staggered boards. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at 
1007–09. As the table below reflects, among the largest companies, a classified board is the
exception and not the rule.
Board elections S&P 500 S&P MidCap S&P SmallCap S&P Russell
400 600 1500 3000 
Annual elections 88% 65% 58% 70% 61%
Majority voting in 89% 63% 49% 67% 52%
director elections
ERNST & YOUNG CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY THE NUMBERS
(2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-cgbtn-monthly-
june-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAT5-HJ84] (statistics current as of June 2019). 
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
    
  
   
 
   
      
  
 
  
  
 
   
    
 
510 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
law, Delaware not only resuscitated the directors’ duty of care18 but 
also established templates by which control could be defended19 and 
sold.20 Delaware further held directors act in bad faith if they have a 
“sustained or systematic failure” to maintain legal compliance 
systems.21 Massive self-dealing transactions such as going-private
transactions and incestuous controlling-shareholder-initiated mergers 
were also subject to a newly minted entire fairness inquiry that includes 
consideration of not just price but directorial process.22 
The linchpin of these developments is those courts’ wholesale buy-
in to the important monitoring role of outside directors—the core 
feature of the governance movement. Simply put, the quest for 
directors independent of managers is not an end in itself. It is the 
correlative obligations for individual directors to advance shareholder 
interests that is the objective of the movement. Delaware courts 
stepped forward, as did other courts, in marrying fiduciary duties to the
widely received monitoring model. 
Those who think of Corwin as a natural analog to the above 
discussion argue that the corporate governance movement is a social 
force driven by a belief that shareholder interests and protection are 
best served by an independent and well-informed monitor. From this 
perspective, Corwin takes the expedient course and eliminates the
intermediary—the independent board of directors—and in its place
rests protection on the palpable force of shareholder self-interest: the 
majority approval by the owners to a transaction allegedly tainted by
fiduciary wrongdoing is the ultimate arbiter of what is in the 
shareholders’ best interest. Therefore, like so many other areas of 
18. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873–74 (Del. 1985) (establishing that directors 
exercising informed business judgments is within the duty of care and that the directors acted with
gross negligence by hurriedly approving the sale of the company at approximately a 50 percent
premium over its publicly traded market price).
 19. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (setting forth 
a two-part test directors must meet when engaging in defensive maneuvers). 
20. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(requiring the board to take affirmative steps toward obtaining the best price for the firm when 
control will be transferred).
 21. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(embracing within the director’s monitoring role the duty to have reasonably designed
information and reporting systems to assure compliance with the law as well as performance of
the company).
 22. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711, 715 (Del. 1983) (substituting an
obligation of a controlling person to establish fair price and fair dealing for the formerly used
business purpose inquiry).
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corporate law, the ultimate rule is the one of majoritarianism whereby 
the will of a majority of the voting owners carries the day. 
We believe that a shareholder vote, such as that which is 
celebrated in Corwin, is misunderstood and that according it with
insulating misconduct surrounding the approved transaction not only 
misinterprets the import of the vote but also distorts the corporate 
governance developments reviewed above. As such, the emphasis on a
shareholder vote unduly insulates from judicial review director and 
officer failures to act as trustworthy stewards in the sale of their 
company.  
One factor that looms large in our thinking is the overwhelming 
frequency with which shareholders are relied upon to approve 
complex—and often conflicted—transactions. If shareholder approval 
of the deal is the first—and, per Corwin, the only—line of defense to
managerial misconduct in connection with M&A transactions, we
would expect that activist investors would be regularly turning down 
bad deals. In fact, the record of shareholder voting on such matters is 
at best ponderous. Empirically, shareholders rarely vote down
mergers. We can illustrate this point using data from Professor Morgan 
Ricks’s database on mergers and acquisitions.23 His data cover all 
mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. public company targets 
undertaken after January 1, 1996, and concluded by March 31, 2017.
The minimum-size deals included in the database is $1 billion, and
there are a total of 1,620 deals included in it. In all, only five deals were 
rejected by shareholders in a formal vote. In other words, a total of 0.3
percent of all mergers have a failed shareholder vote. An additional
seventeen deals were withdrawn before completion, some of which 
may have been withdrawn because of an anticipated negative
shareholder vote. If all twenty-two transactions are counted as
shareholder-rejected deals—which is certainly an overestimate—then 
only 1.3 percent of large mergers fail from lack of shareholder 
approval.24 
23. We thank Professor Ricks for sharing this data. 
24. Others have also found that M&A transactions rarely are disapproved by their
shareholders. See Matteo Gatti, Reconsidering the Merger Process: Approval Patterns, Timeline,
and Shareholders’ Role, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 850–54 (2018) (finding in a study of arms-length
mergers involving Russell 3000 firms in 2006–2015 that slightly more than 1 percent failed to
obtain shareholder approval); John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, Paying for the 
Privilege of Independence: Termination Fees Triggered by “Naked No Votes,” INSIGHTS: CORP. &
SEC. L. ADVISOR, Sept. 2007, at 1, 2 (observing that shareholders rejected only eight out of more
than one thousand M&A transactions from 2003–2007). 
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Other data sets yield the same result. For example, from a universe 
of fifty going-private transactions instigated by controlling 
shareholders between 2010 and 2017, Professor Ed Rock isolated
seventeen in which the transaction was conditioned on approval by a 
majority of the minority holders. In none of those transactions did the 
minority shareholders reject the transaction.25 Moreover, in his analysis 
of some of the going-private transactions that involved the agitation 
against the transaction by an activist hedge fund, Professor Rock noted 
that all of them ultimately resulted in the activist investors accepting
the deal.26 He explained this as reflecting that activists had no better 
means to exit from the target company than the one provided by the 
controlling stockholder.27 
Finally, there is strong empirical evidence that indicates 
“management wins all of the close” votes in situations where the board 
of directors is submitting management proposals for shareholder 
approval.28 Professor Listokin’s study “examines votes on 
management-sponsored resolutions and finds widespread irregularities 
in the distribution of votes received by management.”29 He further
notes: “Management is overwhelmingly more likely to win votes by a 
small margin than lose by a small margin. The results indicate that, at 
some point in the voting process, management obtains highly accurate 
information about the likely voting outcome and, based on that
information, acts to influence the vote.”30 Though Listokin’s data 
largely involve management-sponsored proposals related to stock
options or bonus plans, they do include merger-approval votes that are 
required by statute.31 His findings support the argument that managers 
have a huge advantage in obtaining approval of closely contested 
merger votes. 
The above record of the low percentage of shareholder “NO”
votes is equally supportive of two distinct but opposing propositions:
(1) the shareholder vote means nothing as they blindly support the deal
25. Edward B. Rock, Majority of the Minority Approval in a World of Active Shareholders, 
in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 105, 115–17 (Luca Enriques & 
Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019).
 26. Id. at 121, 124, 127. 
27. Id. at 129–31.  
28. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159,
172–75 (2008). 
29. Id. at 159.
 30. Id.
 31. Id. at 169–70 & 169 tbl.1. 
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or, if not blind, will prefer the sparrow in the hand over the pheasant 
in the bush; or (2) all deals are great deals because the prospect of a 
vote by the shareholders chastens managers and self-dealing directors 
to think twice before they submit a suboptimal deal for shareholder 
approval. In this Article, we put forth empirical evidence and close 
reasoning to support the first proposition. For instance, as we develop
in Part V, after the announcement of a merger agreement, there is a 
substantial shift of stock into the hands of merger arbitrageurs who are
committed to the deal’s success and who will invariably vote in its 
favor. This has a significant effect on the odds of a merger closing, 
raising the likelihood of deal completion to near certainty in many 
cases. 
We begin by developing several arguments, not considered by 
Corwin and its supporters, regarding why we do not believe that 
obtaining the statutorily mandated stockholder approval for a
transaction is dispositive of whether actionable misconduct on the part
of its participants has occurred; simply stated, and as developed below, 
these are two very different matters that need to be separated. In Part 
I, we review the well-received views on the relative competencies of 
shareholders in public corporations to engage in collective decision-
making. Our conclusion is that the qualities that equip shareholders to
be competent investors in securities are not the same qualities needed 
to assess whether managers have misbehaved. 
In Part II, we challenge a key assumption of Corwin that today’s
environment of shareholder activism, and particularly the forces that 
have nurtured it over the past twenty years, will continue in the future 
to be a check on managerial opportunism and slack. In fact, the ecology 
of shareholder voting in its current coordinated form is under attack 
and faces strong countervailing forces. Moreover, those championing 
the cleansing effect of the shareholder voice because of the growing 
ownership interest of financial institutions must consider that most 
financial institutions themselves face substantial conflicts of interest 
that can impact their dispassionate assessment of a matter submitted
for shareholder approval. Their conflicts and the compromise they 
entail in rejecting weak, or even bad, M&A deals are examined in Part 
III.
Part IV addresses a central concern with any approving vote by 
the stockholders, namely whether shareholders face a distorted choice
so that their will is hardly free, even if informed, and even if they 
possessed the competencies needed to evaluate all the issues 
surrounding the transaction that they are asked to approve. In a vote 
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on the proposal to approve the merger that is bundled with approving 
managerial misconduct committed in the merger process, shareholders 
have a binary choice of accepting or rejecting the deal. As one
commentator put it, “[t]his means that the shareholders’ choice 
ultimately comes down to asking whether the deal before them is better 
[than] no deal at all.”32 Thus, we develop reasons why the vote
absolving managerial misconduct should not be bundled with the vote 
required for the transaction to occur. 
In Part V, we present our empirical analysis of how share 
ownership among financial institutions shifts materially to short-term 
investors—largely hedge funds—from medium- and long-term 
institutional holders. These hedge funds have no interest in litigating
corporate management’s conduct during the sale process. Instead, they 
inevitably vote to approve the deal so that they can capture the spread
between the deal price and the price at the time of the first 
announcement of the proposed transaction. We show that this shift 
places a “thumb on the scale”—in some instances a determinative 
thumb—in favor of shareholder approval of the transaction.  
In Part VI, we examine the role of shareholder votes in self-
dealing transactions, a matter excluded, at least presently, by Corwin.33 
The presence of self-dealing behavior does not change the conclusions 
drawn from our data and analysis in Parts I–V; however, when the self-
dealing falls within the narrow scope of state conflict-of-interest 
statutes where shareholder approval is viewed as an alternative the
legislature has set forth to address a self-dealing transaction, it is not 
possible to discard the import of that vote. Nonetheless, as we develop
in Part VI, our Article’s qualifications to the appropriate meaning of 
such a vote greatly tempers the ultimate force to be given shareholder
32. Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 32; see also Korsmo, supra note 2, at 7 (“Fundamentally, a
merger vote is typically a Hobson’s choice—approve the merger as is or reject it altogether— 
rather than anything resembling a traditional ratification.”).
33. Also, our focus in this Article is distinct from the authority provided in corporate statutes
for shareholders to ratify lawful acts that nonetheless, when undertaken, were not authorized due 
to failing to comply with a provision of the applicable corporate statute, a corporation’s articles
of incorporation or bylaws, or corporate resolution or agreement. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 204–05 (2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.45–.52 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Such provisions
provide governance mechanisms, either through approval by the board of directors or
shareholders, followed by a filing with the state administrator, whereby a prior unauthorized act,
such as issuance of shares that were beyond the number authorized by the articles of
incorporation, can be retroactively validated. Such statutory provisions do not validate breaches
of fiduciary duty that might accompany corporate transactions of the type that are the focus of
this Article.
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approval of self-dealing transactions. Our suggestions regarding what 
to make of shareholder ratification are set forth in our concluding 
section. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE CONSIDERATIONS
Corporations are not democratic institutions. In a democracy,
power flows from the voting populace, and it is this body that is then
governed. The populace governs the procedures for selecting
candidates for office so that continued service as its elected
representative depends heavily on popular support to be the nominee
in the election. This is not the case with the corporation. By statute, 
power over corporate affairs is lodged in the corporation’s 
“governor”—the board of directors.34 Importantly, the source of the
board’s power and its legitimacy is derived from the statute and not the 
shareholders. In addition, the power is exercised over interested 
parties, such as nonvoting security holders and labor, who do not vote 
in the election of directors. Indeed, the spheres within which 
shareholders have authority are limited in number and deeply
circumscribed.35 Like children, shareholders are visible but, per 
governing statutes, are rarely consulted. Their largest power is their 
right to turn their elected representatives out of office. But this occurs 
rarely because of formidable institutional friction. Moreover, 
shareholder authority to vote for directors is deeply qualified by the
fact that they seldom have the authority to nominate directors, and 
even when this rare power exists, it customarily only permits 
34. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney 2019) (“[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its 
board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board
of directors.”). Each of these are default provisions that can be changed—but rarely are—by a 
provision included in the firm’s articles of incorporation, and each are subject to discrete
provisions set forth in the governing corporate statute that conditions a limited number of
transactions, discussed later in this Section, to concurrence by shareholders thereby entitled to
vote.
35. For a review of the history of stockholders being relegated to having a vote on so-called
fundamental or organic changes as more power over corporate matters was delegated to the board
of directors, see, for example, Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting
Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18–28 (1992) (reasoning that shareholder approval is not required for
many decisions that rival the importance of mergers or amendments of the articles of
incorporation that do require shareholder approval). 
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shareholders to nominate a distinct minority of the board.36 Even in 
instances where a corporation has installed majority-vote requirements 
as a condition for directors continuing to serve, the only true political 
voice for shareholders is a negative one.37 To be sure, stockholder 
approval is required for so-called fundamental transactions, such as 
mergers and the sale of substantially all of the company’s assets. 
However, these transactions must be initiated by the board of 
directors, which controls their timing as well as the information upon 
which shareholders rely in deciding whether to approve the matter.38 
Each of these features of the process result in the board being the more
powerful of the two approving groups.39 
Other areas of the shareholder franchise are also deeply qualified.
The power to sell shares is qualified by the ubiquity of poison pills that
constrict takeovers and, accordingly, constrict the opportunities for 
shareholders to dispose of their shares.40 Shareholder information
rights are also conditioned on, among other considerations, 
demonstration of a proper purpose for the demand. And when the
request is directed toward learning of corporate wrongdoing, this 
standard is further qualified on allegations of a “credible basis” for 
36. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS: DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKET 
PRACTICES 2 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Proxy_ 
Access__Developments_in_Market_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3RN-6YAH] (reporting
that 87 percent of bylaws adopted by two hundred companies in the 2015–16 proxy season limit
the number of directors that can be nominated to 20 percent of the board and that 71 percent of 
those stated the limit was two directors); see also Hamermesh, supra note 16, at 136–56 (setting
forth other limitations that accompany shareholder nominations such as advance notice and
background information). See generally Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at 1019– 
22 (describing the history of SEC proposals for rules and limitations on proxy access, including
only nominating a minority slate).
 37. See sources cited supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
 38. See, e.g., tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 271(a) (setting forth requirements for a merger or sale of all or
substantially all the assets in which stockholder approval of the transaction is required but the 
shareholder vote only occurs after approval by the board of directors). Under Delaware law,
companies also have substantial freedom to manipulate the form of an acquisition to avoid
holding a shareholder vote. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 124–25 (Del. 1963)
(rejecting the de facto merger doctrine). 
39. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 257, 270–71 (2015) (noting that before the courts, proposals of the board and those by the
shareholders do not stand on the same footing, at least in Delaware, where courts demonstrate
more skepticism regarding consequences attached to shareholder initiatives than those by the
board). 
40. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) (upholding
the use of a poison pill to prevent shareholders from tendering shares while recognizing the pill’s
potential to be abused).
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believing wrongdoing has occurred.41 The final shareholder right is to 
sue, where, in the case of derivative suits, the shareholder must address 
the large hurdle posed by the demand requirement.42 Further, the 
shareholder may find that the suit is inconveniently lodged in Delaware
or another forum favored by the company via a forum-selection 
bylaw.43 In light of such serious limitations on the shareholder 
franchise, Corwin’s embrace of not just the virtues but also the 
paramount force of shareholder approval is at best quaint and most 
likely seriously misplaced. 
There are very good reasons why the shareholder franchise is both
limited in scope and deeply qualified. The genius of business 
organizations is their efficiency, which in large measure flows from
enabling individuals with very different skills, experiences, and other
endowments to combine with resulting synergies. Business 
organization law facilitates specialization and, in doing so,
accommodates the unique limitations of owners whose personal 
endowment and circumstances justify their status as owners but not 
managers of the enterprise. Thus, the dentist with a successful practice
will enjoy disposable income that she may profitably invest, but time,
skills, and experience justify the dentist having only a passive role in a 
business organization, as her endowments likely better qualify her for 
the profession of dentistry than that of being a captain of industry. For 
41. James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of Delaware’s 
“Tools at Hand” Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation 10 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 19-10, 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Seinfeld v.
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 118, 123 (Del. 2006)), https://bit.ly/36KI7gl
[https://perma.cc/K8DQ-U76J]; see Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 123 (reaffirming that access to company 
books and records so as to determine if misconduct has occurred will be provided if there is a 
credible showing by “documents, logic, testimony or otherwise” that wrongdoing has occurred).
However, in some states access is limited to minutes of board or shareholder meetings and does
not extend to general corporate records. See, e.g., Feuer v. Merck & Co., 187 A.3d 873, 878–81
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018) (holding that seeking internal communications among directors
bearing on derivative suit demand was outside the scope of documents expressly authorized by
statute).
42. There are many permutations to the demand requirement, but regardless of the 
particular approach, the plaintiff invariably faces a perilous gauntlet to traverse to file a derivative 
suit. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 5:7, :11 (2018) (examining various approaches taken by courts to excuse plaintiffs in a 
derivative suit from making a demand on the board of directors as a precondition to initiating the 
derivative suit). For further information on the demand requirement and the use of special
litigation committees in place of the full board, see 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, §§ 15.7–.8. 
43. There is now statutory authorization for forum-selection bylaws after being upheld in
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). See tit. 8, § 115; 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.08 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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example, business decisions in the extraction of minerals likely are light
years away from the skill and experience of the extracting dentist. 
Moreover, many decisions with respect to engaging in that business 
must be made more quickly than could feasibly be carried out within
even an organization with a modest number of similarly situated 
owners. Business organization law allows, through either a statute or 
private ordering, centralization of business decisions in a group that by 
composition and organization do not face similar time, skill, or 
experience constraints.  
At the opposite end of the decision-type spectrum are transactions 
that entail an evaluation of the enterprise and, unlike ordinary business 
decisions, are not seriously time bound. These transactions require 
investment skills and experience of the type that we can conclude such
owners possess by virtue of their having become an owner in a business 
organization.44 Examples of such transactions are amendment of the
rights, privileges, or preferences enjoyed by owners, the sale of the 
firm, its acquisition of another firm of at least equal size, and the firm’s 
dissolution. Within the corporate realm, these so-called fundamental
transactions must be approved by the firm’s stockholders.  
Shareholder concurrence for fundamental transactions is justified
on twin bases. First, the shareholders have the skill and experience to 
make such investment-like decisions, as consideration of each type of 
fundamental transaction elicits heuristics not different from the skills 
and experience owners are believed to possess and employ when they
made their initial investment in the firm. Second, these decisions are 
not so time bound that the transaction would be jeopardized by the 
convention of a very large body of owners. In the area of acquisitions,
there is a third justification for shareholder voting, namely, that 
management may be deeply self-interested in the transaction so that
the shareholder vote might be a useful prophylaxis.45 
44. For a development of why some decisions involve the board of directors or officers and 
others also include shareholders, see EISENBERG, supra note 9, at 12–17, 68. For a fuller
development, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7–15 (1969) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The
Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management].
 45. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management, supra note 44, at 27–32. 
For a fuller discussion of the justifications and limitations of shareholder voting, see generally 
Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1368–69, 1377–84. The factors developed by Eisenberg are
reasons why the endowments of shareholders are believed sufficient to permit participation in
decision-making, at some level, in transactions meeting the factors. This understanding of 
Eisenberg’s analysis addresses concern expressed in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 633–34 (2d ed. 1995), that shareholders
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At the same time, some smaller body must be involved in 
negotiations and resulting refinements for the transaction. To that end,
corporate law requires that fundamental transactions are first 
approved by the firm’s board of directors. Note that central to the 
corporate structure is not just the time dimension but more importantly 
relative institutional competence. Remote owners face institutional
limitations that restrict their approval to transactions that require the
same skill and experience that they employed when they became 
owners in the first instance. 
We have genuine concerns, anchored in institutional competence, 
with the view that the basis for believing shareholders possess qualities 
that justify their right to approve fundamental corporate changes also 
support the view that their approving voice should enjoy the same level
of deference when that vote is considered as also approving misconduct 
that may have occurred in connection with that transaction. That is, the 
reasons developed above that underlie shareholder participation being 
mandated for certain structural transactions are not present when the 
matter before the shareholders is whether to excuse alleged managerial
misconduct. 
Our fundamental concern is that when shareholders are asked to 
approve whether to pursue a claim of misconduct, this entails a very 
different type of decision than the decision to approve a fundamental
transaction where corporate law justifies shareholder action. In
describing the characteristics of decisions that can include shareholder 
approval, Professor Melvin Eisenberg lists matters involving general 
enterprise-evaluation skills; matters whose magnitude, risks, and time
span effect make the matter significant; matters that occur 
infrequently; and matters that need not be decided quickly.46 A charge 
of managerial misconduct in connection with a matter that requires 
shareholder approval does not appear to us to meet any of these four 
considerations. 
Delaware’s own initiative in 1969 to strip any reference to a
demand on shareholders from its provision dealing with procedures for 
cannot be expected to be intensely involved in the many features of a complex transaction, and
therefore that they are not appropriate decisionmakers. Corporate law can be seen as embracing
Eisenberg’s reasoning while addressing Professors Gilson and Black’s concern by conditioning
that in acquisitions and other fundamental corporate events, shareholder involvement is not
greater than approving or disapproving the transaction formulated initially by the board of
directors. 
46. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management, supra note 44, at 10–11. 
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initiating a derivative suit support our thinking on this.47 Through the 
first half of the last century, a precondition to maintaining a derivative 
suit was that the plaintiff had to either make a demand on the
company’s shareholders or set forth in the complaint certain well-
received bases for why making such a request would be futile.48 The
most prevalent bases for alleging futility was that the conduct 
challenged in the complaint could not be ratified by a mere majority
vote of the shareholders.49 Generally, a demand on the shareholders 
was excused when the complaint focused on acts that were fraudulent, 
illegal, or ultra vires and on allegations that the public nature of the 
corporation made the demand not practicable.50 During the second half
of the century, such a demand on the shareholders became nearly 
nonexistent, falling prey to an ever-expanding range of grounds the
courts accepted as rendering the requirement futile.51 
Over the past few decades, law reform efforts, such as the 
influential American Bar Association Model Business Corporation
Act and the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, rejected requiring a
demand on shareholders.52 A central basis for abandoning the 
requirement is various institutional competence considerations. For all
but the private company, the stockholder meeting itself is a highly
stylized, nondeliberative event marked by very low attendance relative
to the ownership base.53 In the public company, the true meeting is a
virtual meeting that occurs within the electronic solicitation and 
execution of proxies. Whether shareholders participate by proxy or 
physically attend the meeting, neither medium is conducive to their 
undertaking a penetrating engagement of the facts by examining 
47. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:6. 
48. Id. §§ 5:2, :3 (noting that even in the states where the requirement has not been
abandoned, “[f]ew recent cases ultimately require demand on shareholders”).
49. The leading case is Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. 1958).
 50. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:4 (discussing the “practical realities of shareholder
decisionmaking”); id. § 5:6 (explaining when alleged wrongs are nonratifiable by a majority vote
among shareholders); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03
Reporter’s Note 8 (naming practical concerns and nonratifiable conduct as among the reasons
modern decisions excuse demand on shareholders).  
51. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. h. (reviewing 
an extensive list of bases developed by the courts to excuse a demand on the shareholders). 
52. Id. § 7.03(c) (“Demand on shareholders should not be required.”).
 53. See DEMOTT, supra note 42, § 5:4 (responding to common justifications for a demand on
the shareholders and observing that “[t]he central difficulty with these arguments is that they
ignore the practical realities of shareholder decisionmaking in all but the very smallest
corporations”).
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documents, raising questions, or participating in an interchange with 
other shareholders let alone discussing the facts under applicable law. 
Moreover, any material revelation that occurs at the meeting would 
come too late to affect the vast number of proxies earlier cast by a 
nonattending shareholder. Furthermore, the dominant role of the
proxy statement in the shareholder engagement is itself unsettling
because the relevant disclosures are so dependent on information 
prepared at the direction of likely self-interested directors or their 
designatees. Thus, the American Law Institute (“ALI”), in rejecting a 
demand on the shareholders as a precondition to initiating a derivative 
suit, concluded: 
As a general rule, informed collective shareholder consideration of
proposed litigation is not feasible. As a body, the shareholders cannot
realistically discuss or evaluate the often complex factual and legal 
issues raised by derivative actions . . . .54 
In a case considering whether a demand on the shareholders was 
required in a suit alleging fraudulent behavior, the Delaware Supreme 
Court was similarly dismissive of shareholder approval of such matters:
[W]e think it clear that in the ordinary case the stockholders in
meeting could not satisfactorily determine the probable merits of a
minority stockholder’s suit without a reasonably complete 
presentation and consideration of evidentiary facts. . . . A 
stockholders’ meeting is not an appropriate forum for such a 
proceeding.55 
54. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. h. Even though
the ALI eliminated a presuit demand requirement on the shareholders, it did not totally remove
shareholders’ consent. Section 7.11 calls for a court to dismiss a derivative suit based on the 
shareholders’ approval of a resolution, passed by a disinterested board, in reliance on a thorough
and independently prepared report, that dismissal is appropriate, and on the disclosure to the 
shareholders “of all material facts” regarding the action. The derivative-suit plaintiff is also
provided an opportunity to make a brief statement of the plaintiff’s views of the action and the
pending proposal for dismissal. Id. § 7.11 (excluding actions that constitute a waste of company
assets). The ALI observes:  
Although it may be argued that shareholders are too disorganized or are too remote
from the events to reach an informed decision with respect to a technical issue such as
the merits of a pending action, the requirement . . . of ratification by disinterested
shareholders plus the waste limitation . . . helps to alleviate this problem. Recognition
must also be given to the fact that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation,
and as such cannot be excluded from a significant voice in deciding matters affecting
them.
Id. § 7.11 cmt. c (emphasis added). The comments further observe that such shareholder approval
would be most likely relevant in close corporations. Id. § 7.11 cmt. d.
55. Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (Del. 1958). 
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In short, just as a shareholder vote lacks efficacy as a screening device
for derivative suits, we believe that the shareholder vote approving a 
deal should lack any cleansing effect because of institutional 
competency considerations and because the shareholder forum is ill-
suited for addressing whether misconduct occurred. 
The institutional investors’ use of third-party voting advisors, such
as Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, to assist 
them in their voting decisions does not alter this conclusion. These
voting advisors are not experts on Delaware law, nor do they have
access to the internal information that experienced trial lawyers are 
likely to have in a full-blown litigation over a breach of the directors’ 
fiduciary duties. Proxy-voting advisors are primarily concerned with 
assessing whether the proposed merger is superior to no transaction at 
all for their clients. They do not discuss the preannouncement conduct 
of the target firm’s directors in their recommendations to institutional 
investors. 
Ours is a minority position. The effusive support from
contemporary judicial decisions and commentators for the efficacy of
shareholder power is an understandable response to the growing 
concentration of share ownership among institutional investors. The
rise and dominance of the institutional investors in capital markets and, 
more importantly, in ownership of public companies feeds the 
mechanisms by which corporate developments are efficiently priced 
and reflected in securities prices, erodes the number of shareholders 
who are rationally apathetic, and greatly ameliorates concerns about
the collective action problem. In combination, the shareholder voice
today can be—and is—more frequently heard in the boardroom than
at any time in the history of corporate law. In such an environment, it 
is reasoned that the protective oversight provided by courts is 
unnecessary: 
[C]orporate law is no longer vital to the regulation of U.S.
corporations. The transformation of American equity markets from
retail to institutional ownership has relocated control over
corporations from courts to markets and has led to the death of 
corporate law.56 
56. Goshen & Hannes, supra note 7, at 265 (footnote omitted).
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The belief supporting this thesis is that “the more competent 
shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be.”57 This
view reflects the increasing frequency of activist shareholders and their 
concomitant success in pressing headline-grabbing changes with 
respect to a range of corporate governance items.58 
We believe, however, that corporate law, much as Mark Twain 
famously denounced his demise as premature, can rightly claim it has 
not become superfluous in the era of institutionalized markets. To be 
sure, we are impressed how in just a few years’ time institutional 
investors have enforced new norms of operation on public companies.
Institutional voices have made classified boards of directors the 
exception and not the rule among large public companies, have led to 
majority-vote provisions being the norm, have started a trend among
large companies for mechanisms to nominate directors, and have
turned the poison pill into a vanishing, albeit not extinct, species.59 
But while some commentators have pointed to these
developments as a basis for corporate law becoming irrelevant,60 it
57. Id. at 269; see also id. at 289 (“[T]he increased deference of the Delaware courts to 
market actors reflects the Delaware courts’ correct understanding that sophisticated shareholders 
are better positioned to adjudge the merits of board decisions and to discipline disloyalty and
incompetence.” (emphasis added)). This belief seems deeply qualified by, among other things,
the scope of shareholder competence, such as whether it extends only to personal experience with
governance or whether it includes the intricacies incident to evaluating whether misconduct 
occurred in a particular instance. The volition of the shareholder choice in deciding an issue and
the richness of the information on which shareholder action is based are two additional
considerations.
 58. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 620 & tbl.3 (2013) (reporting there were 1,164 hedge fund 
campaigns between 2000 and 2007 with a 29 percent success rate); see also Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 13, at 867 (developing the basis to understand how the arrival in today’s market of the
activist shareholder addresses the reticence of many institutional holders to exercise their voting
power for changes in governance procedures and operations); see also generally Alon Brav, Wei
Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) (gathering evidence regarding targets, methods and
consequences of hedge fund activism); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2015) (reviewing how institutional investors with
sizable holdings in companies have successfully targeted a range of corporate changes).
59. The Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School has been actively assisting 
institutional investors in pursuing these goals over the past several years. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/TZA8-XF48].
 60. See, e.g., Goshen & Hannes, supra note 7, at 269, 277–82. And weaknesses in shareholder
competence, to some extent, is regularly addressed via proxy advisors. See George W. Dent, Jr., 
A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1288–89 (2014) (describing the rise
of proxy advisors as a response to collective action problems among shareholders); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and
Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005) (reporting on the supplicating steps company 
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should not be overlooked that their foundations are based on a few 
fragile organizations that could be wiped away with a regulatory brush.
We explore this concern later in Part III. Even in the current regulatory 
environment, each of these modern corporate governance 
developments involves shareholder preferences of how they wish to 
participate in the governance of the firm. None of the matters depends 
on the assessment of idiosyncratic facts or arcane principles of law 
regarding a particular individual, event, or firm as do decisions 
regarding whether misconduct might have occurred and, if so, whether 
it is reasonable to initiate suit to redress the misbehavior. Simply
stated, governance questions such as board declassification involve 
universal questions regarding the prerogatives of shareholders.61 Each 
of these issues—and many others—now dotting the corporate 
governance menu regularly serve up problems that are well within the 
competence of the shareholders to consider; because they are so
shareholder centric, however, it is not reasonable to conflate such 
governance developments coming from the force of institutions with 
the belief that institutional voices can be the sole bulwark against 
managerial misconduct. 
The most basic disconnect committed by Corwin-esque thinking is 
not appreciating that the endowments shareholders are assumed to
possess, which justify statutes calling for their approval for 
fundamental transactions or governance matters, are very different
from the skills and experiences required to assess whether shareholder 
or corporate interests are best served by prosecuting claims that
managers have engaged in misconduct. Whether the facts are sufficient 
to support a claim that the officers or the directors breached a fiduciary
obligation when selling the company and whether the shareholder 
believes twenty-five dollars is acceptable consideration for his shares 
are both complex questions. Yet as observed above, the latter is no 
more complex—and requires no more skill—than the initial decision 
made by the investor to purchase the company’s shares at twenty 
executives regularly undertake to obtain the approval of governance, compensation, and
acquisitions of proxy advisors). This, of course, is also subject to matters of expertise and
information constraints that the advisor may have in the particular case.
61. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570–73
(1990) (identifying antitakeover amendments, confidential voting and greenmail prohibitions
among items within the focus of then rising activism of financial institutions); see also Kahan &
Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 15, at 1005–12 (describing the typical changes in corporate 
governance as a result of shareholder voting and nonbinding shareholder proposals, including
majority elections for directors, de-staggered boards, declassification of boards, and changes to
executive compensation).  
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dollars; the heuristics, whether they be discounted expected cash flow 
or comparative book values or other inputs into share valuation 
models, are the same. Alternatively, there is nothing about the 
cognitive process by which a shareholder became a stakeholder in the 
firm that mirrors the range of questions presented by a claim of 
managerial misconduct. The purchase of shares does not require the 
same skills that are necessary to answer questions regarding the facts 
that can be established about the alleged skullduggery by managers, 
the quantifiable harm that can be shown to have occurred, and the 
associated probabilities with each of these questions. Simply stated, 
shareholders are investors, not experienced corporate trial judges. 
II. THE FRAGILE ECOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER 
VOTING
Those according shareholder approval votes as obviating further 
inquiry into wrongdoing surrounding the approved transaction assume
that the corporate voting system will maintain in its existing form in the
future. As shown in this Part, however, that system is fragile, being 
under attack by corporate management. There is no guarantee that the
system will survive that assault, and if it does not, then the intellectual
justification for Corwin and related cases will disappear. To explain this 
point, this Part returns briefly to first principles to demonstrate why 
corporate voting’s virility should not be assumed. 
A. Key Elements of Institutional Investor Voting System 
The basic problem in corporate voting is: Why does anyone vote 
at all? Investor gains are often tiny, while the costs of becoming 
informed are significant, even with the mandatory disclosure rules of 
federal law.62 In addition, there are significant collective action 
problems for investors; if there are any benefits derived from voting, 
then nonvoters garner those benefits too—without incurring the costs 
of voting.63 As a result, small investors have little incentive to vote their 
shares.64 
62. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1385. 
63. See Robert B. Thompson, The Power of Shareholders in the United States, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 441, 449–50 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds.,
2015) (identifying costs incurred by institutional investors in voting their shares on an informed
basis). 
64. Apathy among retail investors is a significant concern. Among S&P 500 companies, 21.7
percent of the shares were not voted in 2015. Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent”
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Institutional investors hold much larger stakes in public 
corporations today65 and could, in theory, exert substantial influence 
over corporate governance issues.66 These investors can expand their 
influence by buying more stock, which increases their ability to capture
the gains from voting and reduces the uncertainty over the outcome in 
a contested vote. Their power is limited, however, by the amount of 
money that they can invest in any particular company as well as legal 
rules, such as the poison pill67 and § 16(b) short-swing-profit 
restrictions.68 The costs of voting in contested situations are also 
substantial if institutions wish to win because, not only do they need to 
be informed, they also have to incur the costs of coordinating the vote
and of persuading other investors. 
As a result of these burdens, most institutional investors would
prefer not to vote on the majority of issues. For example, mutual funds 
compete with each other on the basis of relative performance;
informed voting costs money that cuts into the firm’s performance
statistics, while any benefits from informed voting accrue to the fund 
even if it chooses not to vote.69 To borrow a phrase from Gilson and 
Gordon, mutual funds are “rationally reticent.”70 That is, they are 
unwilling to invest in voting because it does not help them attract
business and may even cost them in their relationships with current and 
existing clients. Similar issues arise for other types of institutional 
investors such that it should not be assumed that if they were left to
Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61 (2016).
Evidence that a good portion of this nonparticipation was by retail investors is that substantial
increases in the number of nonvoted shares followed regulatory changes in 2009 and 2011 that
removed the authority brokers once enjoyed to vote the shares they held in street name when not
instructed by their beneficial owners how their shares were to be voted. Id. at 61–62. 
65. Institutions hold more than 50.6 percent of the stock of the largest 500 American
corporations. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13 (2010),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101111_ConferenceBoard.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9JYL-D93Z].
 66. See Black, supra note 61, at 570–75 (describing, for example, victories among pension
plans in supporting corporate governance proposals as well as institutional shareholders’
legislative lobbying efforts).
 67. Id. at 550–51 (describing poison pill thresholds that set a maximum limit on shareholder
ownership in a company).
 68. Id. at 545 (“Exchange Act section 16 requires . . . 10% beneficial owners of public
companies to report purchases and sales to the SEC and to forfeit any ‘short swing’ profits.”).
 69. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1392–93. 
70. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 895. 
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their own devices, they would be interested in actively monitoring
corporate management using their voting power.
One significant exception is the activist hedge funds. These funds 
purchase substantial blocks of targeted companies’ stock and then 
aggressively agitate for changes at the firms.71 Hedge funds identify 
value-enhancing, corporate-governance-related strategies and appeal 
to institutional investors to support them in persuading corporate 
management to implement them.72 In addition, other hedge funds 
frequently follow the lead hedge fund, buying substantial amounts of 
the targeted firm’s stock and then supporting the lead fund in its efforts 
to bring about corporate governance changes.73 Top hedge funds’ 
voting initiatives have been very successful even when vigorously 
opposed by corporate management.74 Even with the increased 
presence of hedge funds, however, most institutions are reluctant to 
spend significant resources on voting initiatives unless required to do 
so. 
Enter the government. In 1988, the Department of Labor declared
that institutions subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act75 must vote their stock in a manner that would maximize the value
of the fund’s portfolio.76 Failure to do so could result in plan trustees 
or managers facing regulatory sanctions. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) passed a similar rule for mutual funds in 2003.77 
Both rules incentivize fund managers to vote their fund’s shares even 
when they might otherwise be tempted not to do so.78 
71. Brav et al., supra note 58, at 1730. 
72. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1394–95, 1416. 
73. Id. at 1414–15. 
74. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge
Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 308–09
(2016) (demonstrating that top hedge funds are quite successful in overcoming aggregate numbers
of takeover defenses).
75. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.)
76. Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth
Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL 897696.
77. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 
(Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2018)) [hereinafter Proxy Voting by Investment
Advisers]. 
78. Recently, however, both the Department of Labor and the SEC have backed away from 
this requirement and allowed funds not to vote their shares when the costs of voting them exceed
its benefits. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 
526–27 (2018). 
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Faced with a need to vote their shares in an informed manner, but 
still not wanting to devote large amounts of their staff’s time and
energy to the endeavor, institutions instead choose to buy voting advice 
from third-party voting advisors.79 These proxy-advisory firms 
specialize in collecting information about upcoming corporate votes, 
processing it, and providing advice to their institutional clients about 
how to vote their shares.80 While many institutions do some of their 
own research on important votes, they generally rely on proxy advisors 
to assist them in uncontested situations. 
The combination of the mandated institutional voting, third-party 
proxy advisors’ research and voting recommendations, and activist 
hedge funds initiating contested proxy-voting situations has led the 
Delaware courts to lionize the corporate voting system and put
shareholder ratification on a pedestal.81 However, as shown in the next 
Section, corporate management and their advisors, while welcoming 
the cleansing effect now accorded shareholder ratification, are at the 
same time urging the federal government, including the SEC, to
destroy the carefully built structure on which corporate voting rests. 
B. Attacks on Corporate Voting System 
Some commentators have suggested that the SEC should 
reconsider its regulation of institutional investor voting. David Larcker 
and Allan McCall penned a letter in The Wall Street Journal that
argued, “[t]he SEC should reconsider the entirety of the shareholder
voting process, including the mandate that institutional investors 
participate in all corporate votes.”82 Their basic point is that 
institutional investors should be free to make decisions about when it
is worthwhile for their beneficiaries to vote at all and that proxy advisor 
recommendations should be grounded in research that shows they 
enhance shareholder value.
Corporations have also attacked proxy advisors as too powerful 
and subject to severe conflicts of interest.83 Commentators claimed that 
there is a lack of transparency in how the proxy advisors arrive at their
voting recommendations and that there are potential conflicts of
79. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1397. 
80. Id. 
81. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015).
82. David F. Larcker & Allan L. McCall, Proxy Advisers Don’t Help Shareholders, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at A17.
 83. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1403–04. 
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interest when advisory-firm employees serve as directors on boards of 
companies that the advisors rated.84 There are claims of direct financial 
conflicts where, for example, ISS’s consulting business markets its 
services to corporate issuers, giving the appearance that corporate 
clients might receive more favorable recommendations from the firm.85 
Partly in response to these issues, the SEC in 2010 raised the 
question of whether proxy advisory firms should be subjected to 
regulatory oversight because their voting recommendations impact 
voting at firms in which they held no economic stake.86 This issue and 
others were discussed further at the Proxy Advisory Services 
Roundtable held on December 5, 2014, where the SEC sought public 
comment on the services provided by proxy advisory firms, conflicts of 
interest, and the transparency and accuracy of their recommendations 
to clients.87 Subsequently, Congress in 2017 considered the Corporate
Governance Reform and Transparency Act, H.R. 4015,88 which would
regulate proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis by requiring them “to 
register with the SEC and disclose among other things, the procedures 
and methodologies [they use] to develop proxy voting 
recommendations and any conflicts of interests.”89 On July 30, 2018, 
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton announced that a second SEC roundtable 
on the proxy process would be held.90 Clayton announced that among
the topics to be discussed are proxy advisory firms and whether they 
suffer from conflicts of interest and lack transparency about their 
84. Id. at 1404. 
85. Id.
 86. Id. at 1403; see Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No.
62,495, Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,340, 75 Fed.
Reg. 42,982, 43,011 (July 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275).
 87. Proxy Advisory Services Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-advisory-services.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q4MZ-U3Z7].
88. Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 4015, 115th Cong.
(2017). 
89. Steve Seelig & Puneet Arora, The Regulation of Proxy Advisors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/03/the-
regulation-of-proxy-advisors [https://perma.cc/UD42-5NV5] (stating that the legislation is
“widely supported” by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable).
 90. Jay Clayton, Statement Announcing SEC Staff Roundtable on the Proxy Process, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-announcing-sec-staff-roundtable-proxy-process [https://perma.cc/LSS5-
C822]; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Proxy Voting and the Future of Corporations, 
LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:46 PM), available at
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/11/28/proxy-voting-and-the-future-of-
corporations [https://perma.cc/JQ8H-J6ZU] (summarizing the testimony and viewpoints of the
participants of the roundtable).
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voting recommendations.91 The Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs also held a full committee hearing on these 
issues.92 
In the meantime, on September 13, 2018, the SEC withdrew two 
staff advisory letters that address the independence of proxy advisory
firms under SEC Rule 204 (4)-6 (“the Rule”).93 The SEC stated that 
the letters were withdrawn in order to facilitate meaningful comments
from the public in anticipation of its upcoming roundtable.94 However, 
according to The Wall Street Journal, the withdrawal came after six
91. Clayton elaborated on areas that might “warrant particular attention”:
• Whether various factors, including legal requirements, have resulted in
investment advisers to funds and other clients relying on proxy advisory
firms for information aggregation and voting recommendations to a greater
extent than they should, and whether the extent of reliance on these firms is
in the best interests of investment advisers and their clients, including funds
and fund shareholders.
• Whether issuers are being given an appropriate opportunity to raise 
concerns if they disagree with a proxy advisory firm’s recommendations, 
including, in particular, if the recommendation is based on erroneous,
materially incomplete, or outdated information.
• Whether there is sufficient transparency about a proxy advisory firm’s voting
policies and procedures so that companies, investors, and other market
participants can understand how the advisory firm reached its voting 
recommendations on a particular matter, and whether comparisons of 
recommendations across similarly situated companies have value. 
• Whether there are conflicts of interest, including with respect to related 
consulting services provided by proxy advisory firms, and, if so, whether
those conflicts are adequately disclosed and mitigated.
• The appropriate regulatory regime for proxy advisory firms and whether
prior staff guidance about investment advisers’ responsibilities in voting
client proxies and retaining proxy advisory firms should be modified,
rescinded, or supplemented. 
Clayton, supra note 90 (footnote omitted).
 92. DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ,
SENATE COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARING ON PROXY VOTING PROCESS 1 (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/nonmember/docs/12_07_18_proxy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZWZ7-H65Q].  
93. The SEC issued a statement concerning the withdrawal of the two letters. Statement
Regarding Staff Proxy Advisory Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-regarding-staff-proxy-advisory-letters 
[https://perma.cc/GGG3-N2EJ]. The withdrawn letters are: Egan-Jones Proxy Services, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2004 WL 1201240 (May 27, 2004) [hereinafter Egan-Jones Letter]; Institutional 
Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2093360 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
ISS Letter].
 94. SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters Regarding the Use of Proxy Advisory Firms – 
Chairman Clayton Issues Statement Regarding Staff Views, ROPES & GRAY (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2018/09/SEC-Withdraws-Two-No-Action-
Letters-Regarding-Use-of-Proxy-Advisory-Firms-Chairman [https://perma.cc/UNW9-RW4B]
[hereinafter ROPES & GRAY, SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters].
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Republican senators asked the Government Accountability Office to 
determine whether the SEC overreached in issuing the two letters.95 
The Rule regulates when investment advisors may vote their 
client’s securities.96 When it was adopted in 2003, the SEC stated that 
an investment advisor could meet its duties under the Rule, thereby 
proving that their vote of the client’s securities was not a product of a
conflict of interest, by demonstrating that the advisor voted the proxies 
in accordance with procedures based on the recommendations of an
“independent” proxy advisory firm.97 The withdrawn letters detailed in
what situations a proxy advisory firm might be considered 
independent.98 Clearly, the SEC is actively considering completely 
rewriting the rules that regulate proxy advisors. More pointedly, the 
letters’ withdrawal was a barometer in forecasting political headwinds
for proxy advisors. 
These forecasts proved accurate when, on August 21, 2019, the 
SEC voted 3–2 along party lines to approve new guidance for proxy
voting by investment advisors and proxy advisory firms.99 Although the 
precise impact of these new guidelines is still being debated as this
95. Dave Michaels, Public Companies Score a Win in Fight To Limit Reach of Proxy
Advisers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-companies-
score-a-win-in-fight-to-limit-reach-of-proxy-advisers-1536862260 [https://perma.cc/H29Z-
MCNK].
 96. ROPES & GRAY, SEC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters, supra note 94 (“Th[e] Rule . . . 
ensure[s] that investment advisers vote proxies in the best interest of their clients and provide
clients with information about how their proxies are voted.”).
 97. Id. (“[T]he SEC stated that an investment adviser could demonstrate that its vote of its
clients’ proxies was not a product of a conflict of interest if the adviser voted the proxies in
accordance with a pre-determined policy based on the recommendations of an ‘independent’
proxy advisory firm.”). 
98. Id. The Egan-Jones Letter confirmed that a proxy advisory firm could still be considered
independent, even if it has been given compensation by a corporate entity being evaluated for
other services. Id. The ISS letter stated that neither an individual nor a case-by-case evaluation of
a proxy advisory firm’s conflict procedures was necessary, but that instead an investment advisor
may determine that a proxy advisory firm is able to make independent decisions by reviewing its 
conflict procedures overall. Id. 
99. Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, 
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-33605, 84 Fed. Reg. 47420 (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5325.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA7W-ED3P]; Commission
Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting
Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86721, 84 Fed. Reg. 47416 (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/34-86721.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B84-TBLM]; SEC Issues
Guidance To Clarify Investment Advisers’ Proxy Voting Responsibilities and the Treatment of
Proxy Advice Under the Proxy Rules, ROPES & GRAY (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/08/SEC-Issues-Guidance-to-Clarify-
Investment-Advisers-Proxy-Voting-Responsibilities [https://perma.cc/G228-YFBW].
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Article goes to press, “[b]usiness groups that pushed for such changes, 
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, applauded the SEC’s action, while 
advocacy groups such as the Council for Investor Rights and Corporate 
Accountability said [they] would limit shareholders’ ability to hold 
companies accountable.”100 As Commissioner Allison Herren Lee
stated, the new guidance first “introduces increased costs and time 
pressure into an already byzantine and highly compressed process.
Second, it calls for more issuer involvement in the process despite 
widespread agreement among institutional investors and investment 
advisors that greater involvement will undermine the reliability and
independence of voting recommendations.”101 Finally, we note that
those who believe the institutional investor voice can substitute for 
state fiduciary duty law, such as appears to be the case in some
Delaware cases,102 speak of an era that appears to be changing. The era
that appears to be passing is one where a great many large institutions 
relied on proxy-advisor expertise rather than their own. The recent
developments at the SEC suggest a reversal of this practice, although
it is hard at this point to gauge fully its impact.
In addition to new regulations for proxy advisors, consider the 
future of the dominant activist investor. Hedge fund activists’ 
leadership on voting initiatives rests upon their ability to generate
value for themselves and other shareholders. However, whether hedge
funds increase value is a hotly contested question. Their detractors 
argue that, while there are often short-term value increases associated 
with hedge fund activism, these gains come at the expense of the long-
100. Andrew Ramonas & Andrea Vittorio, SEC Answers Pleas To Rein in Proxy Firms ISS, 
Glass Lewis (2), BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 21, 2019, 11:27 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X7M77JQS000000?bna_news_filter=securities-law
&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016caf89d2d0a1fdffb933c30001#jcite [https://perma.cc/MCR9-
DRJZ]. 
101. Statement of Commissioner Allison Herren Lee on Proxy Voting and Proxy Solicitation
Releases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-lee-082119 [https://perma.cc/YR68-FFFP].
 102. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[C]orporate law 
should not be designed on the assumption that diversified investors are infirm but instead should
give great deference to transactions approved by them voluntarily and knowledgeably.”); see
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–314 (Del. 2015) (“When the real parties in
interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by
simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to the 
stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms
of benefits to them.”).
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term value of the targeted companies.103 Prominent corporate attorney
Martin Lipton has argued that the omnipresent threat of hedge fund
interventions has led corporate management to manage companies for 
the short term rather than focusing on long-term value enhancement.104 
Moreover, even if hedge funds generate value, they do so at a
significant cost: hedge fund managers are extremely well paid for their 
efforts, typically receiving 15–20 percent of net fund profits and a 1–2 
percent management fee on invested funds.105 Despite their fee
structure, successful hedge fund managers have been able to attract 
institutional investors to invest in their funds and have frequently been 
able to persuade them to vote in their favor in contested situations.106 
However, there are also regulatory initiatives that would 
adversely affect hedge funds that the SEC has recently considered. One
proposal that has been debated actively is to reduce the ten-day waiting 
period for early warning Rule 13d filings to shorten the number of days 
that hedge funds have before they must disclose their positions in 
targeted firms.107 While this proposal was not adopted, there continues 
to be substantial pressure on regulators from corporate management
and their supporters to weaken activist hedge funds.108 
103. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors [https://perma.cc/
74CD-P59W] (“There are, however, encouraging signs that major investors are increasingly
concerned that hedge-fund activism is undermining long-term value, and that they are ready to
support well-run companies and their long-term strategies against short-term activist attacks.”).
One recent study found that in the long-term, hedge fund activism had no significant effect on
firm value. Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic Consequences
of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions 7, 18–23 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Fin., Working 
Paper No. 577/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260095 [https://perma.cc/P54U-GM5X]. 
104. See Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, supra note 
103 (stating that non-hedge fund investors, as a result of hedge fund activism, have begun to
support companies in their long-term strategies to resist “short-term activist attacks”).
 105. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1408 (discussing the compensation incentives of
hedge fund managers). 
106. See id. at 1415–18 (detailing institutional investors’ support for hedge fund activism). 
107. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012) (highlighting the SEC’s proposal to shorten the 
current waiting period). 
108. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt,
Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137 (2013)
(discussing and defending a petition from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to the SEC arguing 
that the 13(d) disclosure rules should be changed from ten days to one day). 
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To summarize this discussion, each of the critical links in the 
corporate voting system, which has been lauded by the Delaware
courts as providing investor oversight of managerial conduct in sales of 
the firm and in controlling-shareholder self-dealing, is under attack. 
Losing any one of these important planks—mandatory institutional 
voting, well-informed proxy advisors, or hedge fund leadership on
corporate voting issues—will have a devastatingly negative impact on
the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring via their voting power. 
Proponents of shareholder ratification as a cleansing device for
managerial misconduct, such as Wachtell Lipton,109 often appear to be
simultaneously lobbying to undermine the foundations of effective
shareholder voting.110 We would hope that the Delaware courts would 
at least be sensitive to the dangers that these “reform” efforts will have 
on the effectiveness of corporate voting as a ratification device.
III. CONFLICTED VOTING CASTS DOUBT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF 
SHAREHOLDER RATIFICATION
Ratification voting frequently suffers from conflicts of interest.111 
When this happens in a merger, the shareholders voting—often large 
institutional investors—may not be voting to maximize the value of the 
109. See, e.g., William Savitt, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Post-Closing Merger Litigation—The
Road Ahead, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/28/wachtell-lipton-discusses-post-closing-merger-
litigation-the-road-ahead [https://perma.cc/AD4V-Z3MD] (“The evolving doctrine affirms the
view that, with sophisticated institutional investors now dominating equity markets, the courts
can (and as a matter of efficiency should) avoid extensive litigation-driven second-guessing in the 
great run of transactional situations.”).
110. For example, three Wachtell Lipton partners state:
Although the [SEC Commissioner’s] guidance does not eliminate the fundamental
structural concerns that such vast power has been given to a small group of companies
that own no shares, are largely unaccountable and appear to have business imperatives
to create ever-evolving “best practices,” it will hopefully lead to more thoughtful and
responsible use of proxy voting advice and propel further action to ensure greater 
disclosure regarding conflicts of interest, lack of transparency and other concerns that 
have been expressed concerning the proxy advisory industry.
David A. Katz, Trevor S. Norwitz & Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell Lipton Discusses SEC
Regulatory Guidance on Proxy Advisory Firms and Proxy Voting Responsibilities, COLUM. L.
SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/02/ 
wachtell-lipton-discusses-sec-regulatory-guidance-on-proxy-advisory-firms-and-proxy-voting-
responsibilities [https://perma.cc/W376-4HFQ].
 111. See generally Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in
Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019) (discussing institutional investor conflicts of interest
in the context of mutual fund intermediaries).
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
     
   
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
   
   
 
2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 535
target firm but rather to further some other interest.112 In this Part, we
focus on some of the key conflicts of interest that emerge. We argue 
that these conflicts impact a significant percentage of the shares voted 
to approve mergers, undercutting the claim that the approval vote
reflects shareholders’ preferences to absolve corporate management of 
legal liability. 
A Institutional Conflicts of Interest
Private corporate pension plans are run by trustees who are 
selected by the management of the firm whose employees are the 
fund’s beneficiaries.113 The private pension fund can be invested in the
sponsoring company’s stock and, not surprisingly, will vote those 
shares in a manner designed to please corporate management.114 More
broadly, the managerial orientation pervades private pension funds so 
that the funds tilt heavily toward supporting the management of 
portfolio companies.115 In a merger, private pension funds will probably 
vote their shares in favor of the transaction, even where it may not be 
a value-maximizing deal. This is especially true if they have a bigger 
investment in the target than the bidder.116 
Mutual funds also face conflicts that arise from employers’ control 
of what funds will be available for their employees for retirement 
planning.117 Employers have wide latitude to decide which funds they 
offer to their workers. As a result, mutual fund managers are reluctant 
to vote their shares against the wishes of corporate management and, 
more generally, are hesitant to earn a reputation of being 
antimanagement.118 In the context of a merger, target and acquirer 
112. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 887 (2010) (“Institutional intermediaries and their decision-makers
hold a variety of complex economic interests that challenge their incentive to maximize firm
value.”).
 113. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1401. 
114. See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85
J. FIN. ECON. 552, 554, 568–69 (2007) (giving examples of mutual funds’ conflicts of interest in
corporate governance and finding “that the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely
it is to vote in favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by management”).
 115. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1401 (suggesting that ties between pension plan
managers and corporate managers could affect funds’ voting).
 116. Id.; cf. Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1175.  
117. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1402–03; Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1178– 
79.
 118. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1402–03 (“Employers can choose from a wide
variety of funds and fund managers and are loath to cast votes that might cause employers to cut
off their access to employees’ retirement money.”).
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
  
536 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
management both wish to see the deal approved, providing a powerful 
incentive to mutual fund managers to vote favorably on the deal. 
Additionally, mutual funds with a reputation of not supporting the 
management of their portfolio firms face challenges when hawking
their services to corporate managers as desirable components of a
firm’s retirement options for its employees. Given the huge size of the
mutual fund market, it is frequently the case that collectively these 
funds are the largest single voters on the transaction.119 
Labor union pension funds may suffer from a different type of bias 
in a merger context: they may seek to maximize the value of labor’s 
share of the deal rather than maximizing the value of shareholders’ 
returns in the transaction.120 This problem arises because labor union
shareholders wear two hats: they generally vote like other shareholders 
on issues that do not affect them in their capacity as workers, but in
situations where they are voting on issues that affect their jobs or future 
as workers in a company, they may well vote in their interests as 
workers at the expense of shareholders.121 In some mergers, where the 
acquirer seeks to eliminate workers by reducing benefits, union 
shareholders may have a strong interest in voting against the 
transaction even though it is value increasing for shareholders.122 
Public pension plans, such as CalPERS, may also have a different 
type of conflict. Their trustees are often politicians or political 
appointees. The political interests of a fund’s trustees may lead them 
to direct merger votes in a way that maximizes their own welfare, even 
though it does not increase the value of their fund’s stock holdings.123 
This may cause the fund to promote politically valuable transactions at 
the expense of its own beneficiaries by approving value-decreasing
mergers.124 
SEC rules contain provisions that require funds in these 
circumstances to have policies and practices to explain how the funds 
119. Id. at 1386, 1387 tbl.1. The high degree of market concentration in the mutual fund
business may mitigate this conflict, as the largest funds may be less concerned about losing a single
client because of a merger. Id. at 1403. 
120. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998) (discussing 
various conflict-of-interest issues that arise in the context of labor union pension funds). 
121. Id. at 1074 (“On the one hand, [labor unions] could be attempting to increase firm value
in order to maximize their residual share as shareholders. On the other hand, they could be 
sacrificing their shareholder value in order to protect jobs or otherwise help their members.”).
 122. Id. 
123. See Fisch, supra note 112, at 883 (providing examples of this conflict).
 124. Id. 
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resolve material conflicts of interest.125 Under these rules, investment
advisors have a fiduciary duty to vote the securities held by their funds 
under practices and policies that ensure their votes are cast in their 
beneficiaries’ best interest.126 However, these rules are weakly 
enforced with few resources devoted toward identifying violations and 
little enforcement activity.127 
B. Proxy Advisors’ Conflicts of Interest
Institutional investors generally hold diversified portfolios of 
stocks in order to minimize the risks that are associated with any 
individual firm’s securities. For larger institutions, this could mean that 
they own thousands of different companies’ stocks and have voting 
obligations at a huge number of corporate meetings.128 In order to
comply with their fiduciary obligations, the institutional investor would 
need to devote a considerable amount of its staff’s time to digesting 
corporate proxy statements—even in routine voting situations—which 
consequently increases its operating costs.129 To avoid reducing returns 
to investors and beneficiaries, institutions retain third-party voting 
advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, to assist them in performing
their voting duties.130 These proxy advisors analyze the proxy
information that companies supply to their investors and then 
formulate voting recommendations for their institutional clients.131 In
some cases, these firms actually vote the clients’ shares on their behalf 
pursuant to certain voting policies.132 
125. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 77 (describing required policies
and procedures under rule 206(4)-6).
 126. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1396. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. at 1397 (referencing “tens of thousands of votes cast each year” at large
institutions). 
129. Letter from Jonathan Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Head of Corp.
Governance, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. & Coll. Ret. Equities Fund (“TIAA-
CREF”), to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-263.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2MQ-XJSR]
(“Though we dedicate a significant amount of resources to corporate governance research and
the voting of proxies, we still would have difficulty processing the 80,000 plus unique agenda items
voted by our staff annually without utilizing [proxy firm] research.”).
 130. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1397–99. 
131. See, e.g., The ISS Advantage, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS.,
https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss [https://perma.cc/QW8W-LC2G] (discussing the 
process by which proxy advisors provide services to their clients).
 132. Id. 
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
  
    
   
 
  
538 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
As seen in the preceding Part, critics have argued that proxy 
advisors should be subject to SEC regulation because they influence 
voting at companies where they have no economic stake.133 These same
critics have further stated that proxy advisory firms are not transparent 
about how they formulate their voting recommendations, that they 
may have political biases, and that they may sit on corporate boards of 
companies while making recommendations to their clients about how 
that stock should be voted.134 
More importantly, in some instances, the proxy advisors—notably 
ISS—appear to suffer from conflicts of their own. Namely, these 
advisors are selling services to the very corporate issuers whose shares 
they are directing other institutional clients about how to vote.135 
Issuers are concerned that their willingness to purchase these services 
from ISS may indirectly influence the voting recommendations issued
by ISS.136 Despite ISS’s claims that they have built an internal wall 
between these two pieces of its business—and its institutional investors 
clients’ apparent satisfaction with those efforts—the potential for this 
conflict remains a topic of great interest to corporate issuers.137 To the
extent that this conflict, or the others identified in the preceding 
paragraph, results in institutional investors voting their shares partly or
wholly in reliance on tainted recommendations, there is the potential
for shareholder-ratification votes to deviate from what is in the best
interests of the shareholders of the target firm. 
133. See, e.g., Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Dir., Fin. Reporting & Inv’r Opportunity,
Cent. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AY9K-FPQF] (criticizing proxy advisors’ involvement in the voting process); 
James R. Copland, Opinion, Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
7, 2012, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044462010457801225212563290 
8 [https://perma.cc/9CT2-9JSS] (same).
 134. Copland, supra note 133.
 135. Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1404. 
136. Id. (“ISS has a separate consulting business on voting issues that is marketed to issuers.
Issuers that purchase those services may improve their chances of getting a favorable
recommendation from ISS . . . .”).
 137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY 
VOTING 10-11 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263233.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CPZ-
DVCM] (describing institutional investors’ satisfaction with ISS’s mitigation of potential conflicts
and the additional steps institutional investors take to ensure ISS’s independence).
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C. Empty Voting 
In addition to the practices examined earlier in Part I, many hedge
funds hold large positions in target companies when the acquisition is
announced.138 Such holders sometimes resort to sophisticated financial-
hedging strategies to eliminate their financial interest in the target firm 
whilst retaining their voting rights on the merger.139 This is one
dimension of a phenomenon called “empty voting.”140 In a simple case,
if the hedge fund holds shares in the target firm while simultaneously 
selling them short, they can retain a vote on the transaction yet still 
benefit from a decline in the target’s stock price.141 This would give the 
fund an incentive to vote against the merger even when it is value 
maximizing for other shareholders. Conversely, the hedge fund could 
structure the transaction so that it benefits from approving a merger 
that is value decreasing for other shareholders.142 In both of these 
situations, the ratification vote may stem from the hedge fund’s conflict 
of interest and not from any view it has about potential managerial 
misconduct. 
The true extent of empty-voting transactions is unknown, and
there are relatively few instances that have been publicly disclosed.143 
However, such hedging has expanded with the growth of sophisticated
securities-derivatives markets.144 Given the importance of hedge funds 
as a driver of M&A activity in today’s markets, it seems likely that they 
will find themselves in this position in the future. 
138. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1409 (noting that, on average, hedge funds take
larger ownership stakes in target companies than other types of investors). 
139. See Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1172–73. 
140. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006). 
141. See id. at 828 (providing examples of empty voting through purchases of hedged shares);
Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1406 (“By holding shares in a corporation while simultaneously
selling them short, an investor can retain a vote in the corporation yet still benefit from a decline 
in the price of the stock.”).
 142. See Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1406 (stating that empty voting can “lead to a vote
that does not maximize firm value”). 
143. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: 
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 652, 659 (2008) (“How much decoupling
activity is there? Without effective disclosure, we don’t know.”). For several examples of publicly
disclosed empty voting, see Edelman et al., supra note 12, at 1405–06 & n.207.
 144. See generally Hu & Black, supra note 143 (stating that the emergence of over-the-counter
equity derivatives permits the separation of voting rights from economic interest to occur
quickly).
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D. Cross-Ownership Conflicted Voting 
As another investment strategy, some activist hedge funds have 
frequently taken large positions in target company stocks in merger 
transactions.145 In some of these cases, the hedge funds have purchased 
positions in both the target and the acquirer, and they have voted their
stock in a manner that maximizes the value of their overall portfolio.146 
This form of voting conflict has been called a “cross-ownership
conflict.”147 The empirical evidence shows that the ownership splits that
underlie these conflicts are rampant in our economy.148 For example, 
“share ownership has become so concentrated that ‘in a hypothetical 
conflict between two S&P 500 firms in 2005, 15% of the equity in either 
firm would on average be held by institutional investors that prefer the 
other side to win.’”149 
Mutual funds frequently find themselves in this position as well 
because they hold diversified portfolios that contain shares of many 
different stocks.150 Many of their passively managed index funds hold
stakes in virtually all public companies of any size.151 When these funds 
hold shares in both the target and the acquirer, they vote their shares
in both companies to maximize the overall value of their portfolio.152 
In mergers between two public companies, the mutual fund needs to 
weigh the impact of the merger on both parties to the transaction. Its 
145. As we demonstrate in Part V infra, a substantial amount of target company stock is 
controlled by merger arbitrageurs. See infra Table 3. For additional discussion of merger
arbitrage, see sources cited infra notes 225–28. 
146. See generally Jarrad Harford, Dirk Jenter & Kai Li, Institutional Cross-Holdings and
Their Effect on Acquisition Decisions, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 27 (2011) (finding a rapid increase in such
“cross-holdings” and exploring their effect on value-reducing transactions).
 147. See Griffith & Lund, supra note 111, at 1172. 
148. Id. at 1173. 
149. Id. (quoting Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 310 (2018)).
 150. Id. 
151. See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders 1 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-39,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 [https://perma.cc/SKS2-
S8D4] (“Index funds . . . have grown to be the largest investors in the capital markets and have
received disproportionate attention.”); John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018, 10:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-
index-funds-1543504551 [https://perma.cc/N4MX-X84G] (noting that index funds control, not
just own, a large fraction of the vote in U.S. corporations—almost 30 percent—and that if the 
trends continue, those funds will control virtually all); Jordan Wathen, Vanguard’s Founder
Warns That Index Funds Could Become Too Big to Function, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 1, 2018, 6:00
PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/12/01/vanguards-founder-warns-that-index-funds-
could-bec.aspx [https://perma.cc/B2EM-4TCQ] (same). 
152. Id. 
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fiduciary duties require it to vote its stock to maximize the value of its 
beneficiaries’ interests.153 In other words, it must weigh both the impact 
of the deal on the acquirer and its frequently opposite effect on the 
target. If the stock value of a mutual fund’s acquirer is increasing by a
sufficient amount to offset its portfolio’s losses to the target company,
then the fund could very well vote its shares in favor of the transaction 
that is a negative wealth-creating deal for the target.154 Furthermore,
this effect is magnified by some mutual funds’ practice of voting all of
the shares in their entire family of funds in the same manner, even
when some of its individual funds may have differing economic 
interests.155 
There is some empirical evidence that supports the claim that this 
cross-ownership conflict is a significant issue for ratification purposes.
A recent study by Brooks, Chen, and Zeng found that institutional 
cross-ownership between firms increases the likelihood of the two 
firms merging but also reduces the deal premium that is paid in the
deal.156 They also found that cross-holders were more likely to vote for 
mergers that had negative announcement returns, while mutual funds 
without cross-holdings were more likely to vote against them.157 This
suggests that cross-holders’ shareholder-ratification votes in mergers 
may be favorable for target management but at the expense of the
target company’s shareholders. 
The preceding review of existing conflicts that confront each
category of institutional investors erodes any confidence that
shareholders vote in a manner that increases their common good.
These conflicts are consistent with the voting results in deal 
transactions reviewed in the next Part.  
IV. CONFOUNDING THE PROBLEM: THE CASE OF DISTORTED
CHOICE
The institutional limitations reviewed above—limits on the 
individual endowments of shareholders, inherent boundaries of their 
acting in a forum that necessarily prevents meaningful engagement of
153. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 77.  
154. See Griffith and Lund, supra note 111, at 1174.  
155. See id. at 1170–71 (discussing high uniformity in voting across funds, even when the views
of portfolio managers differ).
156. Chris Brooks, Zhong Chen & Yeqin Zeng, Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate 
Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 J. CORP. FIN. 187, 189 (2018).
 157. Id. at 212.
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542 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
the issues, and conflicting interests that shareholders can face—are not 
the only problems with according shareholder approval a cleansing 
role. An equally looming malady with contemporary corporate norms 
is that courts allow the shareholder approval of the transaction to 
excuse any misconduct managers may have committed in connection 
with that transaction. Simply stated, the norm celebrated in Corwin, 
followed in other contexts in Delaware and well received outside of 
Delaware, is that it is permissible to bundle in a single resolution the 
deal’s approval as well as a concurrent vote excusing managerial 
misconduct that occurred or may have occurred during that 
transaction. 
A. Inherent Coercion
For shareholder approval to shield management adequately from
accusations of wrongdoing, a threshold requirement is that the 
approval not be coerced.158 Decisions that treat a shareholder vote 
approving the transactions as also surrounding that transaction with
presumptions of the business judgment rule,159 as Corwin did, bundle 
two related but profoundly distinct issues into a single resolution. This 
Section examines whether such a bundled resolution itself is corrupted
because the resulting stockholder approval is the product of a distorted
vote that combines a positive-value resolution—the merger—with a
negative-value item—absolving managers of failing to secure a better
transaction. Inherent in finding a distorted choice is that the decision
entails at least some level of coercion. However, the courts have yet to 
explore the meaning of coercion fully in the context of shareholder 
voting on mergers. 
Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp.160 illustrates the limits of 
a court’s engagement with the issue of coercion. In acquiring Time
Warner Cable and Bright House Networks, Charter Communications 
entered into two contracts: one involving the issuance of shares and 
another granting a proxy to its largest stockholder, Liberty 
Broadband.161 Charter conditioned the two lucrative acquisitions on a
vote by the disinterested shareholders approving both the share 
158. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–12 (Del. 2015).
 159. Id. at 313 (supporting the reasoning of its holding as “tied to the core rationale of the
business judgment rule”).
160. Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2017). 
161. Id. at *4. 
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issuance and the proxy transactions.162 Following shareholder 
approval, Matthew Sciabacucchi, a Charter stockholder, initiated a 
shareholders’ suit challenging the share issuance and proxy as unfair to 
Charter and the product of a breach of fiduciary duty by its director 
and largest stockholder.163 Charter moved to dismiss the case, arguing
that because the share issuance and the proxy transactions had been
approved by a majority of disinterested Charter stockholders, they 
were presumptively valid.164 The Court of Chancery rejected the
argument, stating: “[R]atification will not cleanse a transaction where 
the vote is structurally coercive.”165 It defined a vote as “structurally 
coercive” when “the directors have created a situation where a vote 
may be said to be in avoidance of a detriment created by the structure
of the transaction the fiduciaries have created, rather than a free choice 
to accept or reject the proposition voted on.”166 The court elaborated 
on this position: 
“Coercion” is a loaded term, but a vote so structured by the
Defendants, to accept one (allegedly self-interested) transaction so as
not to lose the benefit of another independent transaction, cannot to
my mind be considered uncoerced. . . . The stockholders did not
decide, necessarily, that the Liberty Share Issuances and the Voting
Proxy Agreement were “in their best interest,” they only decided that 
the Acquisitions and the Issuances and Voting Proxy Agreement 
were, on net, beneficial. The facts are sufficient to an inference that
the Liberty Share Issuances (and the Voting Proxy Agreement) were
unnecessary to the Acquisitions. If so, and if such a vote were 
cleansing, then fiduciaries could attach self-dealing riders to any 
transaction under consideration, and avoid being held to account by 
a favorable stockholder vote. That is not equity; it would represent, 
not a cleanse, but a white-wash.167 
We do not believe it is a long step—indeed, we view it as a logical 
step—to view the shareholders’ approval of a merger with awareness 
that such approval cures any possible misconduct in the transaction as
similarly coercive. Just as in Liberty Broadband, an approving vote can 
only be seen as consistent with the view shareholders accorded their 
approval of both the acquisition and its accompanying misconduct as 
162. Id. at *5. 
163. Id. at *6. 
164. Id.
 165. Id. at *2. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at *4. 
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“on net, beneficial.”168 It is not reasonable to believe the legal
consequence of such bundling should turn on whether there are 
separate, interconnected resolutions, as in Liberty Broadband, or a 
single resolution. Coercion arises in both instances by virtue of their 
being bundled together. 
B. Bundling in the Courts 
Ratification finds its roots in the law of agency, where it developed 
as a series of processes for the principal to become legally bound by the 
unauthorized acts of her agent.169 Thus, most of agency law’s focus is 
on correcting the agent’s lack of authority and not directly on 
approving or excusing the agent’s unfaithful or reckless tortious acts.
In the latter situation, with a single or only a few principals, misconduct 
by the agent can be examined as in any other area where individual
bargaining is possible. As the enterprise becomes larger in terms of
more owners and layers of authority, the principal–agent analogy 
becomes at least attenuated, if not breaking down entirely.170 
A business entity with multiple owners is a very different setting 
than the single-principal-single-agent setting. The corporate context is 
even more removed from the classic agency model: officers and 
directors are not agents of the owners and, as seen above, the owner’s 
prerogatives and endowments are more limited than the classic 
principal’s powers in the law of agency. Nonetheless, share ownership, 
however otherwise circumscribed, has long carried with it the power to 
168. Id.
 169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
170. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997), continues to be the most thoughtful 
corporate decision addressing shareholder ratification. Chancellor Allen denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss a suit challenging Mattel’s stock-option plan as wasteful and self-interested
after the plan had been approved by the stockholders. Id. at 329. The opinion usefully explains 
the possible ways to conceptualize a ratifying vote of the shareholders:
[Ratification] provides, after the fact, the grant of authority that may have been
wanting at the time of the agent’s act. Another [way of conceptualizing ratification] 
might be to view the ratification as consent or as an estoppel by the principal to deny a
lack of authority. In either event the effect of informed ratification is to validate or
affirm the act of the agent as the act of the principal.
Id. at 334–35 (citation omitted). 
Lewis also observes that flowing from the fiduciary relationship between the principal
and the agent are requirements that the ratification be preceded by full disclosure and that there
is no coercion of the approval. Id. at 335. Chancellor Allen emphasized how the collective decision
of numerous shareholders complicates the ratification vote in comparison to the single principal
context of the law of agency. Id. He observed that this causes corporate law to make two
important adjustments: the approving vote must exclude the vote of self-interested parties, and
shareholders lack the authority to approve corporate waste. Id. 
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ratify managerial and controlling-stockholder misconduct, such that it 
is now a cornerstone of corporate law that a fully informed, noncoerced
vote of the stockholders is a proper ratification. What varies across 
states are the types of misconduct that is beyond ratification and the 
effect that such shareholder approval has on matters like the burden of
proof and the legal standard by which the conduct will be judged. Our 
initial focus is not on either of these questions. We instead make the 
point that courts have rushed to embrace the substantive niceties of 
ratification—full disclosure, no coercion, and effects of an approving 
vote—but have failed to consider fully the threshold question: Should 
ratification occur only in a freestanding vote?
The ALI’s corporate governance project deals with shareholder 
ratification in only two discrete contexts: shareholder resolutions 
approving dismissal of a derivative suit171 and shareholder approval of 
self-dealing transactions.172 The ALI approach on the question of 
bundling, however, is different in each of the two settings. When 
dealing with the process and effect of shareholder approval of self-
dealing, the ALI comment states in its definition of “disinterested 
shareholder[]” approval in Section 1.16 that “[i]f a shareholder vote is 
required to be and is taken to authorize a transaction under applicable 
state corporation statutes, it can be combined with a vote under 
§ 1.16.”173 Although the use of “combined” leaves open the question of 
whether this refers to a combination in a single resolution so that 
bundling is contemplated, the ALI confines the consequences of any 
approving vote to overcoming adverse inferences that historically
attach to self-dealing transactions where organic corporate law 
requires shareholder approval of the transaction. In contrast, dismissal 
of a derivative suit as a consequence of shareholder approval must, per 
the ALI, occur in a separate resolution that clearly sets forth the factual 
171. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.11.
 172. 1 id. § 1.16 cmt. c.
 173. Id. The other important law reform effort is the American Bar Association’s Model
Business Corporation Act, which takes no express provision on bundling, but it should be read as
permitting the resolution involving a “conflicting interest transaction” to be the same shareholder
approved resolution as required for the transaction to be affected. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§§ 8.61(b)(2), .63(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring that the transaction is duly noticed as
requiring shareholder approval, the conflicted director discloses to the corporation of shares the 
director believes are interested in the transaction, and there is full disclosure of material facts);
see also id. § 8.60(7) (broadly defining the disclosure required in conflict of interest transactions).
The Model Act is clear that its technical provisions address only the “conflicting interest
transaction” and not the board’s failure “to conform with general standards of director conduct.”
Id. § 8.61 cmt. 2. 
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and legal issues surrounding the matter.174 Therefore, within the ALI 
scheme, bundling that involves misconduct that neither supports a 
derivative action nor involves classic forms of self-dealing is not
addressed directly.  
The great bulk of deal-driven litigation falls within this large
lacuna neglected by the ALI. This type of litigation focuses on lapses
in processes pursued by directors or officers in their carrying out the 
transaction. We are thus left to surmise which of the two strands of 
thinking embraced by the ALI should guide a court’s consideration of 
bundling. We believe there are bases to believe that the ALI puts a
heavy thumb on the scale against bundling, or at least against according
an approving shareholder vote full, insulating qualities. First, the ALI’s 
treatment of self-dealing transactions can be seen as burden-shifting 
mechanisms because, even after an admittedly fully informed 
disinterested vote, the plaintiff still can pursue a claim that the 
transaction was so one-sided as to constitute waste.175 
Second, the nonbundling choice for dismissal of derivative suits— 
an inquiry into the transaction’s fairness—is much closer to the type of 
issues posed in the ratification at the heart of deal-generated litigation 
where the issue is whether managerial misconduct occurred in a 
corporate transaction. The central considerations for fairness in self-
dealing have historically been whether there was ample disclosure of 
the insider’s interest in the transaction and whether the transaction was
financially fair.176 Financial fairness is assumed to be the central focus 
of shareholders who are asked to approve an organic transaction.
However, fairness is not at the heart of claims based on inadequate
processes pursued by directors to approve the transaction. The
transaction could easily be within a range of fairness, but managerial 
misconduct could still have harmed the shareholders by not securing a 
price higher up within the range that fairness spans. Thus, although the
fairness prong of the self-dealing inquiry may be satisfied, the 
174. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.11(a) (addressing
procedures whereby a derivative suit can be dismissed upon approval of the shareholders and
calling for “[a] resolution recommending such dismissal” (emphasis added)). The provision
mandates that the resolution submitted to the stockholders be the product of a fully developed
examination by the board of directors or committee of the directors sufficient to support a court 
dismissing the suit were the recommendation made by the directors. Id. (linking the resolution’s
content to the procedures set forth in §§ 7.09(a)(1)–(3) and 7.10(a)).
 175. See, e.g., 1 id. § 5.02(a)(2)(D) (stating that the duty of fair dealing is satisfied where, inter
alia, the transaction does not constitute waste).
 176. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Techs. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 11495, 1992 WL 212595, at 
*2–9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (evaluating a motion to dismiss with this standard).
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managers might still face a claim that even better terms could have 
been garnered for the shareholders but for their misconduct.  
Third, in the section that the ALI devotes to the conduct of 
shareholder litigation, nonbundling was embraced. Thus, were a 
derivative suit filed for management misconduct in a self-dealing
transaction, for which the defense is impartial ratification by the 
shareholders, dismissal of that suit because of a vote by the 
shareholders could only occur if there was an unbundled vote that was 
preceded by preparation of an extensive report supporting such
dismissal. This conclusion appears to be driven by the distinction made 
above between shareholder approval of the fairness of a transaction 
and the more complicated situation involving shareholder evaluation
of a suit for misconduct. The latter certainly requires a richer process,
reflected in the ALI requirement that shareholder approval in those 
situations occur in a truly independent and fully informed procedure.
Much of corporate doctrine takes its cues from Delaware. And 
until recently, Delaware has not been much help to sister states on the 
question of bundling; indeed, students of Delaware jurisprudence have 
witnessed something of a ping-pong match among colliding jurists.177 
Though many Delaware decisions touch upon the topic of 
ratification,178 fewer cases consider whether bundling erodes the 
efficacy of shareholder approval. In Corwin, its most recent
pronouncement on bundling, the Delaware Supreme Court crisply 
stated “this Court has never held that the stockholders had to be asked 
separately to ‘‘‘ratify’ the board’s actions for” their approval to invoke 
the business judgment rule.179 Just a few years earlier, the same court 
in Gantler v. Stephens180 reached a very different result, observing that: 
[T]he scope of the shareholder ratification doctrine must be limited 
to its so-called “classic” form; that is, to circumstances where a fully
informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not
177. For over three decades, Delaware case law regarding the doctrine of shareholder
ratification has been marred by “confusion.” See J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder
Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2014) (explaining that
Delaware courts had undergone an effort “to clarify confusion inadvertently created by loose 
language about stockholder ratification in Smith v. Van Gorkom”).  
178. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384 (Del. 1996); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 84 (Del. 1992); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. 
Ch. 1999). 
179. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311 n.24 (Del. 2015). 
180. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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legally require shareholder approval in order to become legally 
effective. Moreover, the only director action or conduct that can be
ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to 
approve.181 
Gantler was responsive to reasoning used by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder 
Litigation,182 which itself reversed a Delaware Court of Chancery
decision authored by then-Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs, the 
subsequent author Gantler.183 In In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation,184 the plaintiff alleged that the board of 
directors breached its duty of care by failing to disclose all material
facts connected to the merger and breached its Revlon and Unocal
duties by quashing the Union Pacific deal.185 The Court of Chancery 
held the fully informed, uncoerced shareholder approval automatically
extinguished all claims against directors.186 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, holding:
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, the Santa Fe
stockholders were not asked to ratify the Board’s unilateral decision
to erect defensive measures against the Union Pacific offer. The 
stockholders were merely offered a choice between the Burlington
Merger and doing nothing. The Santa Fe stockholders did not vote in 
favor of the precise measures under challenge . . . . Since the
stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger and not 
181. Id. at 713.
 182. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
 183. See id. at 62–63 (reversing in part the decision of the Delaware Chancery Court). In 
Gantler, First Nile’s board determined that the corporation should “put itself up for sale.” 965
A.2d at 700. First Nile’s management team, on the other hand, encouraged the board to abandon
its search, proposing instead a privatization plan. Id. Nevertheless, the board continued to identify
bidders, two of whom offered First Nile shareholders a premium over market price. Id.
Management, however, took actions to obstruct these bidders from moving forward with the
process and instead developed a privatization proposal intended to benefit incumbent board
members. Id. at 700–01. While one lone board member dissented, the rest of the board voted in 
favor of the proposal, which required shareholder approval of an amendment to move forward.
Id. at 702. Just 50.28 percent of disinterested shareholders voted in favor of the proposal. Id. at 
703. This is an example of management winning the “close ones.” See Listokin, supra note 28. 
184. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 13587, 1995 WL 334258 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
 185. Id. at *5. 
186. Id. at *8 (“Under Delaware law, a fully informed shareholder vote ratifies a challenged
transaction and operates to extinguish any claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duty
of care in connection with that transaction.”). 
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2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 549
the defensive measures, we decline to find ratification in this
instance.187 
By holding that the vote approving the merger could not also ratify 
director misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the pro-
bundling facet of then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’s decision in the Court 
of Chancery. 
Delaware’s current embrace of bundling was achieved as a result 
of distinguishing Gantler and Santa Fe Pacific as cases not involving full 
disclosure, a factor not emphasized in either of those decisions.188 More
sweeping is that Delaware jurisprudence has lurched forward in allied 
fronts so that the presence of a disinterested shareholder approval of a 
transaction invokes the business judgment rule in a wide range of self-
187. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., 669 A.2d at 68. 
188. Chief Justice Leo Strine, the author of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in
Corwin, before his elevation to that court, boldly stated that he believed Gantler was wrongly 
decided. He observed that: 
In a merger where there is no controller and the disinterested electorate controls the
outcome from the get go, . . . it has long been my understanding of Delaware law, that
the approval of an uncoerced, disinterested electorate of a merger (including a sale)
would have the effect of invoking the business judgment rule standard of review. . . . It
may be that a vote in that context does not involve “pure ratification,” see Gantler v.
Stephens . . . but I have long understood that under our law it would invoke the business
judgment rule standard of review.
In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 793 n.113 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(citation omitted). Strine’s opinions, throughout his career as a vice chancellor, chancellor, and
Chief Justice, are remarkably consistent in his acceptance of the cleansing effect of a bundled
vote. However, we believe his opinions in the wake of Gantler and before his own opinion in
Corwin reflect an excessively dismissive view of antibundling precedent. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR 
Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch.
2013); In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d 761.
Throughout his long judicial career, Strine has been consistent in his embrace of bundling 
so that even a statutorily compelled vote invokes the immunizing effects of the business judgment
rule if the vote is fully informed and not coerced. See In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d at 793– 
94 (holding that even though the case involved a vote of a majority of the disinterested
shareholders following full disclosure, the vote did not invoke the business judgment rule in a
merger with its 63.08 percent holder; Chancellor Strine reasoned that the approval was
meaningless because the merger required only two-thirds approval so that the minority
shareholders likely did not believe their vote would be meaningful); In re PNB Holding Co.
S’holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (explaining that had 
the cash-out merger been approved by a majority of disinterested shares, the ratification would
have cleansed the transaction); In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 621 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (reasoning that stockholders’ choice to approve an amendment of the articles of
incorporation “carried with it a concomitant obligation on the part of the voters to accept
responsibility for the outcome” and therefore was not coercive and ratified any alleged
misconduct); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 890 n.36 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating
that the shareholder approval of the merger accorded “burden-shifting ratification effect”).
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dealing settings.189 No recent Delaware Supreme Court decision
addresses the historic role of ratification as a concept involving
approval of the agent’s conduct and not the transaction that is the
product of that conduct.190 
C. Federal Proxy Rules 
Prior to 1992, proposals within proxy statements that were 
disseminated to shareholders could be grouped together so long as the 
proposals were “related.”191 However, in October of 1992, the SEC 
altered the manner in which proxy resolutions are to be presented and
voted upon.192 Among the suite of reforms adopted was Securities
Exchange Act Rules 14a-4(a)(3) and (b)(1)—the “unbundling rules”— 
which require proxy forms to “identify clearly and impartially each
separate matter intended to be acted upon”193 and to provide 
shareholders with the “opportunity to specify by boxes a choice 
between approval or disapproval of, or abstention with respect to each 
189. See In re MFW, 67 A.3d at 499, 536, aff’d, Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635
(Del. 2014) (holding that a cash-out merger with a firm’s 43 percent owner enjoys the presumptive
validity of the business judgment rule when effected by a fully informed uncoerced vote of the
disinterested shareholders following negotiation and approval by a fully independent negotiating 
committee); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 424, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding
that the business judgment rule’s presumption applies when a controlling stockholder carries out 
a short-form merger after obtaining, through a noncoercive tender offer, shares tendered by a
majority of the minority with disclosure that if the requisite 90 percent ownership is obtained via
the tender offer, the short-form merger will be consummated at a price equal to the tender offer
price).
 190. In Lewis v. Vogelstein, Chancellor Allen qualified his ratification discussion by noting
that, because the stock-option plan could become effective without shareholder approval, the 
principles he applied would not apply were the vote one required by statute: “I first note that by
shareholder ratification I do not refer to every instance in which shareholders vote affirmatively 
with respect to a question placed before them. I exclude from the question those instances in
which shareholder votes are a necessary step in authorizing a transaction.” 699 A.2d 327, 334 (Del. 
Ch. 1997). In an earlier decision, Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755, 
1991 WL 3920 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991), Chancellor Allen, in a transaction that required shareholder
approval, demurred whether a fully informed uncoerced vote would “constitute[] a defense to
plaintiffs’ claims of breach of fiduciary duty, or merely shift[] the burden to plaintiffs to prove the 
unfairness of the transaction.” Id. at *7. In that case, because Chancellor Allen was able to avoid 
resolving the bundling question because he found that the directors had failed to disclose all
material facts so that the shareholder approval had no effect, it is difficult to conclude whether
there was an evolution in his thinking on the propriety of bundling. See id.
191. Rule X-14A-2(a) of the Securities Exchange Act required that shareholders receive the
right to vote “on each matter, or each group of related matters as a whole.” Amended Proxy Rules,
3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Aug. 13, 1938) (emphasis added).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (1993). The rules were proposed in Regulation of
Communications Among Securityholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (proposed July 2, 1992).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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separate matter referred to therein as intended to be acted upon, other 
than elections to office.”194 Essentially, the unbundling rules require 
that shareholders be able to vote separately on each matter set forth in
a proxy. These changes were made in an effort to improve 
communication between shareholders, managers, and others soliciting 
proxies and to remove unnecessary limitations on shareholders’ 
exercise of their voting rights.195 
Although shareholders may now communicate their approval or 
disapproval with respect to each matter on proxy forms to solicitors,
the implementation of these proposals is still allowed to be
“conditioned” on the approval of other proposals at the discretion of 
managers.196 In their essence, the unbundling rules provide for greater 
feedback between shareholders and proxy solicitors, but they do little 
to shift control of the effectiveness of shareholder voting from 
managers to shareholders. As illustrated by the Liberty Broadband
case, management can continue to provide a distorted choice to 
shareholders by conditioning corporate action on shareholder 
approval of two or more separately presented resolutions.197 This
outcome raises a couple of questions: Why would the SEC allow a form
of bundling by permitting companies to condition action on two or 
more separate resolutions being approved? Moreover, does the SEC’s 
position affect the deference to be given to any shareholder approval? 
The SEC only obliquely suggests why its antibundling provisions 
authorize managers to condition corporate action regarding one 
resolution on the stockholders’ approval of another resolution; the 
proposing release explains that this flexibility is guided by the fact that
“the legal effect of a matter approved by shareholders generally is a
194. Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(1). 
195. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,276
(Oct. 22, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249), which states: 
By removing unnecessary government interference in discussions among shareholders
of corporate performance and other matters of direct interest to all shareholders, these 
rules should reduce the cost of regulation to both the government and to shareholders.
The amendments eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of views
and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and
initiatives presented for a vote of shareholders. . . . The rules also remove unnecessary
limitations on shareholders’ use of their voting rights, and improve disclosure to
shareholders in the context of a solicitation as well as in the reporting of voting results.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (“Shall identify . . . each separate matter . . . whether or not 
related to or conditioned on the approval of other matters . . . .” (emphasis added)).
 197. See supra notes 160–67 and accompanying text.
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question of state law.”198 The SEC’s sensitivity to state law can easily
be understood since, at the time it proposed the antibundling rules, it 
had recently suffered a then-rare rebuke in Business Roundtable v. 
SEC199 to its rulemaking. Indeed, there was significant pushback 
against the unbundling rules from corporate and legal commenters 
based on the notion that the SEC was entering into areas of regulation
traditionally governed by state law.200 Just two years prior to the 
unbundling regulations, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC lacked
statutory authority to prohibit national security exchanges from listing
the stock of companies that violated new rules regulating the creation 
of dual class shares in Business Roundtable. A major part of the court’s 
reasoning was that governance and particularly voting were matters of 
state law that were not swept within the enabling power of the SEC to 
regulate proxies.201 Thus, in crafting the unbundling rules, it is likely
that the SEC was being increasingly cautious about exceeding the 
limits of its authority in light of Business Roundtable. 
On one hand, the unbundling rules may not go far enough in
attempting to right the imbalance of power between managers and 
owners of publicly held corporations, which is greatly tilted in favor of 
managers.202 On the other hand, the corporate and legal commenters 
who pushed back against the efforts to curtail bundling claimed “there
is a “legitimate purpose in providing for a single vote on a group of 
related matters.”203 In commentary to the final rule published in the
Federal Register, the SEC addressed the concern that the unbundling 
rules could be “misleading” to shareholders who may mistakenly 
believe they have a choice to accept some but not all of certain grouped
proposals.204 Certainly, this history cannot support bundling of the type
embraced by Corwin, which included two substantive matters within a 
single resolution. 
198. Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566
(proposed July 2, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
199. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
 200. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,287. 
201. Id. 
202. See James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg & Randall S. Thomas, Quieting 
the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1175, 1183–87 (2016) (discussing the strategic advantage management holds over
shareholders in the corporate web). 
203. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,287.
 204. Id. 
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D. Lurking Disclosure Considerations 
The required scope and detail of disclosure of the possible 
breaching behavior is undeveloped in Corwin. In transactions
regulated by the formal proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act, a
good deal of information about the transaction must be disclosed. Even 
in unregulated transactions, these requirements are something of a
template for proxy materials circulated among the shareholders. 
However, the SEC guides do not address what additional information 
must be disclosed when there are questions about whether the
directors or officers breached their fiduciary obligations in connection
with the transaction. For example, where Revlon duties are an issue, as 
they were in Corwin, how much must the proxy statement disclose 
regarding the steps directors took to assure they had pursued the best 
offer for the firm? On this issue, a fairness opinion is not probative 
because fairness is a range, not a point, unless the opinion opines the 
offer submitted is at the very top echelon of the identified fairness 
range. No doubt such opinions may be acquired, but this merely 
introduces another concern, namely the independence of the 
individuals responsible for the disclosures. Because fiduciary duties are
owed by the board, the attendant disclosures—and for that matter, the
processes followed for the transaction’s approval—cannot be viewed
as the product of an independent decisionmaker. This point is 
particularly true in change-of-control situations such as Corwin. These 
concerns place great stress on Corwin’s embrace of the curative effects 
of shareholder approval. And even more stress arises when the 
bundling itself introduces an unexamined likelihood that the vote is 
coercive.205 
The situation in Corwin itself is instructive on how problematic 
disclosure is in such inquiries. KKR Financial Holdings (“KFH”) was 
a limited liability company with its shares listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange that was acquired by KKR, LP (“KKR”), a limited
partnership with its common units also listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.206 Both firms were formed in Delaware.207 KKR, through its
affiliates, provided management services for the conduct of KFH’s 
business pursuant to a management contract that carried a $26,250,000
205. Note the lack of public enforcement on fiduciary duties by the SEC. See Santa Fe Indus. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (holding that absent deception, the antifraud provision of
the federal securities laws do not apply to breaches of fiduciary duty).
206. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015).
 207. Id. at 306 n.3.
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termination fee.208 Even though KKR and various affiliates held
substantial ownership interests in KFH, Corwin held KKR was not a
control person.209 Consequently, the enhanced scrutiny that Delaware
applies to “self-dealing” did not apply.210 
The parties announced their agreement to the merger on 
December 16, 2013, and their joint proxy statement was filed with the 
SEC on March 24, 2014.211 Thus, three months of trading at the deal-
influenced price occurred before any disclosures through the proxy 
statement were made regarding the KFH directors’ conduct. Nowhere
in the body of the 235-page proxy statement is there any suggestion, let
alone outright statement, that shareholders were asked to approve 
anything other than the acquisition itself. In other words, the proxy
statement neither expressly nor implicitly informed the KFH 
shareholders they were approving both the transaction and the 
accompanying conduct of the KFH directors and KKR.212 To be sure,
at several locations within the proxy statement, disclosures were made
of the steps the directors took to act independently of KKR and to seek 
a fair price for the firm.213 The proxy statement also described in detail 
the relationships that had long existed between KKR and KFH214 and
disclosed how the KFH directors would benefit, through stock options 
and phantom stock compensation plans, from the acquisition in ways
not shared by the KFH shareholders.215 Significantly, the proxy
statement observed that KFH’s independent negotiating committee
and its advisors “concluded that [the termination fee and other terms 
of the agreement] made it highly unlikely that an acquisition of KFH 
would be of interest to any person other than KKR.”216 However, in
repeatedly making these assertions, the proxy statement does not place 
the termination fee in context; the total value of KFH per the parties’ 
final agreement is slightly in excess of $2.6 billion, meaning that the
termination fee is about 1 percent of the transaction’s value—a level
208. Id. at 306 (making reference to a termination fee; details regarding the fee appear in In
re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 986 (Del. Ch. 2014)).
 209. Id. at 308.
 210. Id. 
211. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Schedule 14A].
 212. Id.
 213. Id. at 38 (“Fairness of the Merger”); id. at 91 (“Position of the KKR Participants as to 
the Fairness of the Merger”).
 214. Id. at 37–38 (“Certain Relationships between KKR and KFH.”). 
215. Id. at 98 (“Interests of Directors and Executive Officers of KFH in the Merger.”). 
216. Id. at 32. 
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quite low by comparative termination-fee standards.217 The proxy 
statement did disclose that KFH’s independent committee, through its 
negotiating stance over a couple of weeks, did improve the price
ultimately paid by KKR—the exchange ratio increased in successive
offers from 0.46 KKR units to ultimately 0.51 units.218 Based on the 
closing price as of the date of the proxy statement, the overall increase 
was $1.17 per share.219 Finally, the proxy statement disclosed that 
fifteen various shareholder suits had been promptly filed and, since
their filing, had been consolidated into one federal suit, one Delaware 
suit, and one California suit.220 The statement only generally described 
the nature of the claims.221 Complaints in the three surviving actions 
were included in the proxy statement’s appendix.222 
This sketch of KFH’s proxy statement shows that KFH 
shareholders faced a significant challenge in extracting key voting 
information from a 235-page document. In order to be fully informed, 
shareholders needed to identify pockets of discrete facts in order to 
formulate an understandable narrative about how the KFH directors 
arrived at the ultimate exchange ratio of 0.51 KKR units for each KFH 
share and to evaluate their acts against the multiple claims of self-
dealing relationships and lack of independence. At no point in the body 
of the proxy statement nor in its attachments was there any summary
of the law that applied to the KFH directors or, for that matter, to 
KKR. Nor was there a single place in the proxy statement that collected
the points and counterpoints surrounding the parties’ conduct.
Furthermore, no guiding principles of law nor crisp presentation of 
facts with opposing narratives of those facts were present in the
disclosure documents. Confounding the choice before the KFH 
shareholders is the proxy statement’s clear language that the merger 
was occurring at a time when KKR units were trading at a 52-week high 
217. See id., Annex E, at 7. Because Delaware courts regularly accept breakup fees with a
much larger relative size, see MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 1291–92 (11th ed. unabr. 2014), the limits so accepted 
can be seen as not reasonably discouraging third-party suitors. Also placing the termination fee
in perspective is that KFH’s investment bank garnered $17 million—65 percent of the termination
fee—for its fairness opinion and advice in connection with the acquisition. See Schedule 14A,
supra note 211, Annex E, at 2.
218. See Schedule 14A, supra note 211, at 32–35. 
219. The KKR closing price March 20, 2014 was $23.46. Id. at 2.
 220. Id. at 101–03. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. annex E, F & G.
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
 
 
  
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
   
 
  
  
  
   
     
   
   
    
 
   
   
    
 
     
  
   
  
   
  
 
   
  
556 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
and KFH shares were at their 52-week low.223 It is therefore difficult 
for voting shareholders to view the transaction other than being the 
“bird in the hand” so that, given the uncertainty that pervades litigation
generally, the  rational choice is to forgo litigation by approving the
acquisition.224 
V. A THUMB ON THE SCALE: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE 
EFFECT OF SHIFTS IN THE SHAREHOLDER PROFILE ON VOTING IN 
M&A DEALS
This Part provides empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
changes in shareholder ownership around merger announcements on
the likelihood of merger completion. In this Part, we find strong 
empirical evidence that significant share-ownership transfers from
long-term to short-term institutional investors following the first 
announcement that the firm is being acquired. This finding supports 
the view that the new owners’ interests are the option value of the
consummated acquisition; as such, the new owners’ financial interest is 
223. Id. at 41. 
224. All of this highlights the importance to the plaintiffs of getting discovery about the
statements made in the defendants’ disclosures. From the defendants’ perspective, one of Corwin
and MFW’s greatest benefits is that they cut off initial discovery into the board’s actions related
to the transaction, reducing the plaintiff to reliance upon public information, or filing a § 220 
action, if they wish to challenge the transaction. However, one does not need to look hard to find
pre-Corwin or -MFW cases where in the absence of discovery, significant managerial misconduct
would have gone unrevealed.
In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011), is an
excellent example. In that case, the board of Del Monte Foods agreed to sell the company to a
consortium of private equity firms in what the company’s proxy statement portrayed as a 
reasonably clean deal. See id. at 817. However, as the Court put it, “[d]iscovery revealed a deeper
problem.” Id. In fact, the plaintiffs uncovered facts that indicated the company’s investment
banker, Barclays Capital, had “secretly and selfishly manipulated the sale process to engineer a
transaction that would permit Barclays to obtain lucrative buy-side financing fees.” Id. After 
substantial litigation, the plaintiffs obtained an $89.4 million judgment. See In re Del Monte Foods
Co. S’holder Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 6008590 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2011) (order and final
judgment); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 4802848 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 6, 2011) (stipulation and agreement of compromise and settlement).  
Numerous other cases have been documented where “early access to discovery material
was essential.” Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of
Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 646 (2017). As
Friedlander wrote:
Expedited discovery can uncover e-mails that reveal facts that contradict or are not 
disclosed in a proxy statement or board minutes. If such facts are uncovered in
expedited discovery, and if they are not corrected or disclosed in a supplement to the 
proxy statement, then defendants cannot take advantage of the legal edifice built 
around the significance of an informed stockholder vote.
Id. at 645.
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served by voting in favor of the acquisition and not voting against the 
deal as a means to pursue claims of misconduct. Thus, in investigating 
such ownership changes following deal announcements, we are 
especially interested in movements of equity stock from long-term 
owners, such as mutual funds, to short-term owners, such as merger 
arbitrageurs, and the effect that these movements have on shareholder 
voting on mergers.  
To understand these effects, we must first explain the nature of 
merger arbitrage. When a merger or takeover deal is announced, large 
amounts of the target’s shares change hands as the original 
shareholders of the target, now facing deal-completion risk, seek to
realize the gains in price of the target shares and avoid future market 
and deal risks incident to that security.225 Other investors, called 
merger arbitrageurs, play a pivotal role in fulfilling this risk-avoidance 
strategy. The hedge funds and other short-term investors that pursue 
merger arbitrage strategies, also known as risk arbitrage, buy target
companies’ stock after proposed mergers are announced and hold it 
until deal completion in order to earn the spread between the deal 
price and price after the transaction is announced.226 This spread
reflects the uncertainty that the deal will be successful or that it will 
close under the original terms.227 If the deal were to fail, merger 
arbitrageurs would take a loss given that the price would drop down to
preannouncement levels or lower. This incentivizes merger 
arbitrageurs to be more friendly to target management and more
inclined to approve merger transactions.228 After all, the payoff to the 
merger arbitrageur’s strategy relies on the deal’s success. 
We are informed by experienced proxy solicitors that investors 
who are selling their shares to the hedge funds before merger votes are
225. See Malcolm Baker & Serkan Savaşoglu, Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions, 
64 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 92 (2002); Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, 15
REV. FIN. STUD. 837, 837–38 (2002); Michael Demeter, Merger (Risk) Arbitrage Strategy, AIMA
CAN. STRATEGY PAPER SERIES, Oct. 2007, at 1, https://docplayer.net/20734417-Merger-risk-
arbitrage-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/RWH3-N3WL].
 226. Demeter, supra note 225, at 1.
 227. See id. at 1–2; Thomas E. Holber, Full of Hot Air? Evaluating the Airgas Court’s 
Reservations About Shareholders’ Short-Term and Long-Term Interests in Takeovers, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 123, 140 (2012); Aaron Brown, Opinion, The Reason Merger
Arbitrage Funds Aren’t Doing Well, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-11/merger-arbitrage-returns-are-suffering
[https://perma.cc/TSW5-TJZR].
 228. See Cornelli & Li, supra note 225, at 859; Holber, supra note 227, at 140–41; Jim Hsieh 
& Ralph A. Walkling, Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions, 77 J.
FIN. ECON. 605, 608–09 (2005). 
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often long-term holders in actively managed funds.229 Such long-term 
holders are the parties that are most affected, for better or for worse,
by the actions of target management in structuring the proposed
transaction and negotiating the deal price. Once the deal is announced, 
such long-term shareholders can choose to hold-and-vote or to sell. 
Many actively managed long-term holders generally prefer to sell their 
shares and capture the deal premium rather than to lobby against the
deal, even if they are dissatisfied with the actions of target
management. Investing, or remaining invested, in deal stocks involves
analyzing a significant number of variables that, while unfamiliar to a 
typical long-term, active investor, are within the expertise of merger
arbitrageurs. 
For our purposes, we wish to observe the frequency of such 
ownership changes and assess the extent to which any observed shift in 
stock ownership causes a change in the likelihood of the completion of 
the merger. Logically, if a large block of stock moves out of the hands 
of long-term investors and into the hands of short-term merger 
arbitrageurs, then the likelihood of the merger being approved by 
shareholders increases, even if the deal was the result of careless or 
unfaithful target management actions. This is because merger 
arbitrageurs will make money on deals that close and will lose money
on deals that do not. In this Part, we empirically study what kind of 
deals attract merger arbitrageurs and what their effects are on merger 
outcomes. 
Specifically, we first measure the increase in ownership by short-
term investors, such as hedge funds and other arbitrageurs, from the
quarter before the deal’s announcement to the quarter after that 
announcement. In line with merger arbitrage strategies, our empirical 
results suggest short-term investors buy into target companies once an 
announcement is made, replacing other medium- and long-term 
investors. Second, we show that the likelihood of deal completion is 
increased by this observed ownership change.
A. Methodology and Data 
Our analysis relies on identifying short-term institutional investors 
that engage in merger arbitrage, or similar short-term strategies, as well 
as measuring the change in equity ownership during merger deals. Our 
methodology consists of an empirically based characterization of 
229. This paragraph is based on our confidential conversations with experienced proxy
solicitors.
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investors based on their portfolio horizons. That is, short-term 
investors are defined as those institutions with high portfolio turnover,
while long-term investors are those with low turnover.230 
1. Institutional Investor Turnover. The focus of our analysis is on 
institutional investors’ ownership. In general, an institutional
investment manager is an entity that invests in securities for its own 
account or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the 
account of another.231 Institutional investment managers can include
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment managers,
hedge funds, and corporations, among others.232 Using data on equity 
holdings of institutional investors from public filings with the SEC 
required by § 13(f) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, we calculate
institutional investors’ annualized portfolio turnover.233 Portfolio
turnover is compounded from the quarterly turnover rates, which are
calculated as the lesser of purchases and sales divided by the investor’s 
portfolio size. Hence, it measures the proportion of the portfolio that 
is changed within a year, and the inverse can be used as a proxy for 
investor horizon. 
Table 1 shows sample statistics for portfolio turnover and equity
holdings by institutional investor type. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean
portfolio turnover and standard deviation to describe, on average, how 
often investors change their portfolios and how varied the turnover 
might be within an investor class, respectively. As expected, hedge
funds have the highest turnover—the shortest time horizon for holding
230. Some scholars have related empirical definitions focusing on merger arbitrageurs rather
than a larger set of short-term investors. See, e.g., Baker & Savaşoglu, supra note 225, at 108; Jan
Jindra & Ralph A. Walkling, Speculation Spreads and the Market Pricing of Proposed
Acquisitions, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 495, 497 (2004). An alternative characterization is to use a de jure
classification of institutional investor type. Indeed, as we will show, hedge funds tend to have the 
shortest investment horizons. However, simply relying on type classifications can be problematic,
since some asset management firms, such as GAMCO, might employ merger arbitrage or other
active strategies in their portfolio management, while others take a more passive approach.
GAMCO Investors, formerly known as Gabelli Asset Management Company, is a well-known
investment fund that engages in a broad variety of investment strategies, including merger
arbitrage. See GABELLI FUNDS, https://www.gabelli.com [https://perma.cc/M2PP-2ZMT].
 231. Form 13F-Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form13fhtm.html
[https://perma.cc/9QK6-DQR4].  
232. We rely on Vikas Agarwal, Vyacheslav Fos & Wei Jiang, Inferring Reporting-Related
Biases in Hedge Fund Databases from Hedge Fund Equity Holdings, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1271 (2013),
for a classification of institutional investors into the various types listed in infra Table 1.
233. For a description of the method utilized to calculate institutional investors’ annualized
portfolio turnover, see Agarwal, Fos & Jiang, supra note 232, at 1277 & n.14.
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stock—while traditional buy-and-hold investors234 have the lowest 
turnover. Asset management firms and mutual funds have average 
holding horizons but relatively high variance due to the large fund 
heterogeneity among these institutional investors. Column 3 shows the 
largest institutional investors by total assets under management 
(“AUM”) in equities. The two largest types are mutual funds and asset
managers, which have a mixture of passive and active portfolios and 
investments. Among the top five largest investor classes are hedge 
funds, which account for 10 percent of total AUM. Hedge funds also 
rank second amongst the most numerous investor categories, after 
asset management firms, as shown in Column 4. Finally, Column 5 
shows that on average, hedge funds have one of the lowest number of 
equity positions per investor, which means they are amongst the least 
diversified types of institutional investors. This observation is 
consistent with the view that most hedge funds specialize in specific 
strategies or segments of the equity market so they tend to keep 
concentrated positions. On the other hand, pension funds and mutual 
funds rank as the most diversified investors. 
Table 1: Portfolio Turnover by Investor Type235 
This Table reports statistics on annualized portfolio turnover rates by
investor type. Column 1 and 2 report mean and standard deviation of the 
portfolio turnover statistic. Column 3 shows the total AUM in equities of
each investor type. Column 4 shows the average number of institutional 
investors for each investor type, and Column 5 reports the number of equity
positions or investments per investor. The sample is from 2000 to 2015. 
Turnover Total AUM Avg. # of Avg. # of
Mean SD ($bn) Investors Positions
Hedge Funds 1.64 1.35 1,009.24 648.25 118.09
IB and Brokerage 0.74 0.73 373.94 52.81 552.64
Asset Management 0.62 0.69 2,574.61 1,266.57 153.19
Mutual Funds 0.49 0.38 2,777.46 95.31 504.55
Fin. Arms of Corps 0.47 0.45 42.61 12.69 195.24
Other  0.43 0.69 56.32 42.87 149.93
Insurance  0.42 0.26 467.97 71.43 386.31
234. Buy-and-hold refers to the investment strategy of buying stocks and holding them for a
long time with relatively little trading. In general, endowments, pension funds, insurance
companies and passive asset managers or mutual funds follow this strategy to some degree. 
235. Turnover calculation methodology and institutional investor classification are as
described in Agarwal, Fos & Jiang, supra note 232. 
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2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 561
Banks and Trusts 0.31 0.19 1,987.23 206.25 435.62
Endowments 0.29 0.31 36.91 21.12 111.7
Pension Funds 0.26 0.24 321.44 31.19 779.02
2. Data on Merger Deals. Our data on merger announcements and 
characteristics are from the Securities Data Company (“SDC”) 
database.236 We limited our data to merger deals where the acquirer 
must garner a majority support from the target shareholders to acquire 
100 percent of the shares in the target firm. Therefore, we only use 
mergers and acquisitions where the target firm is incorporated in the
United States, where the acquirer’s existing stake does not exceed 50
percent of the target firm and where data on all deal characteristics is 
available. We match the sample with the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (“CRSP”)237 stock-price data and COMPUSTAT238 
obtained from firms’ 10Qs and other quarterly financial filings. Finally, 
we limit the sample to firms with more than fifty institutional 
shareholders and deals with a value greater than $10 million to avoid 
large changes in ownership from a shift in a small number of
investors.239 In total, the full sample includes 852 merger deals from 
2000 to 2015. 
3. Summary Statistics. Table 2 presents summary statistics of firm 
characteristics for targeted firms in the sample. Firm characteristics are 
lagged one-quarter to avoid endogeneity due to the merger 
announcement and merger arbitrageur activity.240 We first include
236. SDC Platinum Financial Securities Data, REFINITIV SEC. DATA CO. (SDC), 
https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/sdc-platinum-financial-securities [https://perma.cc/ADC8-
V54E].
237. CTR. FOR RES. SEC. PRICES (CRSP), http://www.crsp.com [https://perma.cc/4QRG-
EL5H].
 238. CompuStat® Data from S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P GLOBAL (Oct. 2017),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/compustat-brochure_digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/796L-7DKW].
239. Without a threshold, there are some small firms that have large changes in ownership 
that are not related to merger arbitrage. Results are robust to other thresholds, such as $50 million
or $100 million.
240. In very small target firms with few institutional shareholders, small and possibly
unrelated changes in institutional holdings can lead to large changes in short-term ownership that
do not reflect merger arbitrage activity. This filter improves the performance of our measure of
merger arbitrage but does not qualitatively change results.
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562 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
market capitalization (“Mkt Value”)241 as our measure of size and
book-to-market price (“B/M”)242 as a measure of the growth 
opportunities of the firm. Both these variables might be correlated with 
changes in shareholder composition because they correlate with
growth opportunities and likely determine the merger or takeover
interest in a target firm. The variable “Leverage,” representing the
indebtedness of the target firm, is defined as the ratio of debt-to-book 
equity. “LnVol” is the logarithm of trading volume as a share of 
outstanding shares and measures the liquidity of the target firm’s
stock.243 Liquidity can help explain the cross-sectional variation in 
merger arbitrageur activity because informed investors can more easily
hide their trades.244 We add the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”),
which proxies for the degree of industry concentration and therefore is 
likely to increase regulatory and antitrust risk.245 This is likely to be
correlated with the risk of deal noncompletion for strategic mergers. 
We also include “Revenue Growth,”246 which measures past firm 
performance reflected in the company’s income statement. However,
this does not necessarily reflect future performance since it is not a 
forward-looking measure. Therefore, we add “Stk Ret,” the past 
twelve-month stock return relative to the firm’s industry, which
represents the stockholders’ forward-looking expectations for the 
firms relative to the industry average. The last variable shown in Table
2 is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors relative 
241. Market value, or market capitalization, is the total value of shares outstanding as priced
in the market. See Denys Glushkov, Market-to-Book (M/B) Ratio, WHARTON U. PA. (Sept. 2011),
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/applications/risk-and-valuation-measures/
market-book-mb-ratio [https://perma.cc/H8KF-JEJF].
242. Book-to-market is the book value of equity as represented in the balance sheet divided 
by the market value of outstanding equity. A large book-to-market ratio suggests a company has
limited growth opportunities, while a smaller ratio suggests the opposite. See id.
243. Volume traded is the total quantity of shares traded on a given day. Logarithm of volume
as a share of outstanding shares is a measure of the percentage of trades relative to the number
of shares available in the market. Pagano discusses the links between traded volume and asset
liquidity. See generally Marco Pagano, Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255 
(1989). 
244. Cornelli & Li, supra note 225, at 839, 858.
245. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) is a measure of industry concentration. It is
calculated by taking the sum of the market shares squared for all firms in an industry. Stephen A.
Rhoades, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 188, 188–89 (1993).
246. Revenue growth is an important determinant of merger activity since it is
likely correlated with valuation but is a function of firm history. Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein &
Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN.
933, 946–48 (2012).
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
2019] THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTES 563
to shares outstanding.247 The remaining shares are owned by retail 
investors. On average, 66 percent of the shares in target firms are
owned by institutional investors. Not only do institutional investors 
hold a large share of issued stocks, but they also tend to vote more
frequently than retail investors.248 This means that changes in 
ownership among institutional investors will likely matter more for 
corporate governance issues. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This Table reports summary statistics on the main firm-level variables. Data is 
obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The sample is from 2000 to 2015. 
Variables Percentiles 
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Mkt Value ($M) 1,614.42 5,228.71 12.32 61.59 229.15 1,009.21 6853.64 
B/M 0.72 0.69 0.09 0.34 0.57 0.9 1.93 
Leverage 3.52 4.91 0.15 0.51 1.29 4.28 13.45 
Ln(Vol) -0.31 1.24 -2.48 -1.16 -0.2 0.6 1.56 
HHI 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.21 
Rev Growth 0.12 0.48 -0.33 -0.05 0.05 0.18 0.67 
Stk Ret -0.04 1.04 -0.8 -0.35 -0.11 0.14 0.71 
Inst. Ownership 0.66 0.20 0.31 0.53 0.67 0.79 0.96 
Although the existence of merger arbitrageurs is well known, our 
first step is to quantify the target firm’s shareholder composition
changes around takeover announcements. Table 3 shows summary
statistics for the change in institutional investor composition as a share
of all institutional investors for target firms. Panel A shows the change
from the quarter preceding the merger announcement, “Q-1,” to the 
first quarter ending after the announcement, “Q.” This measure
247. The ratio of institutional investors’ dollar holdings to market value represents the
amount of stock held by institutional investors versus retail investors. See id. at 950. 
248. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking 
(Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 2 (ECGI Working Paper Series
in Fin., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3101473 [https://perma.cc/Q3X9-QNZ6] (“The general apathy of retail investors in 
engaging in voting matters implies that it is crucial that dissidents obtain the support of a majority
of the institutional shareholders of the targeted firms.”); ProxyPulse, 2018 Mini-Season Wrap-Up 
and 2019 Trends, BROADRIDGE FIN. SOLUTIONS (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/ 
pdf/broadridge-proxy-pulse-preview-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QPC-WML7].
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564 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
captures the change in shareholders for a relatively small window 
around the merger announcement.249 Using our measure of portfolio
turnover, we classify investors as short-term (turnover greater than 1), 
medium-term (turnover between 0.33 and 1), or long-term (less than
0.33).250 The key takeaway from Panel A is that short-term ownership
increases on average by a noticeable 11.22 percentage points (of total 
institutional ownership) in the immediate quarter. Moreover, this 
change in ownership does not anticipate but rather takes place only 
after the announcement reflecting risk arbitrageurs in action.251 This 
evidence points to a large participation of short-term, merger 
arbitrageur investors that buy shares after mergers are announced but 
not before, as they do not try to anticipate mergers. Panel A also shows 
that hedge funds tend to be short-term investors that engage in these 
arbitrage strategies, while asset managers and mutual funds, which are 
medium- or longer-term investors, tend to reduce their positions.
Interestingly, the longest-term investors, such as pension funds or
endowments, do not seem to alter their ownership relative to other 
institutional investors. This means that these very few long-term 
investors are likely to remain as shareholders and vote on the merger. 
Panel B in Table 3 shows the change in ownership from the 
quarter preceding the merger announcement, “Q-1,” to the last quarter 
in the merger “Q+T,” where “T” is the duration of the merger from 
announcement to conclusion. In this larger event window, the increase 
in short-term investor ownership is 13.19 percentage points, which is 
slightly larger than in Panel A. This means that merger arbitrageurs 
maintain, and even increase, their positions through the merger-
approval process. The fact that the merger-end change tends to be
larger than the one-quarter change speaks to slow-moving capital in 
some investors as it may take them time to move between positions and 
choose where to invest. Nevertheless, most merger arbitrage investors 
likely buy shares soon after the announcement. There is evidence
(untabulated) of this speediness in the significant increase in short-
249. This is the tightest window we can use since 13(f) ownership data is reported on a
quarterly basis. See Form 13F-Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, supra note 231. 
250. The inverse of portfolio turnover is a proxy for the portfolio horizon, so short-term
investors have investment horizons below one year, medium-term investors have horizons
between one and three years, and finally, long-term investors have horizons greater than three
years.
251. Our data suggests that the change in ownership does not happen before the merger is
announced because there is no change in ownership in the quarter preceding the announcement,
while it is just as large as in Table 3 when the merger is announced only a few days after the Q-1
quarter-end.
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term ownership in the subsample of mergers announced a day before
Q, the immediate quarter-end when investors report their equity 
holdings. This indicates that our measure of change in short-term 
ownership does in fact identify merger arbitrage activity. 
B. Determinants of Arbitrageur Participation 
Although on average there is a large change in short-term 
ownership before voting, some deals seem to attract more arbitrageurs 
than others. Are arbitrageurs mainly present in reasonably riskless and
transparent deals that are unlikely to be challenged? If so, changes in 
ownership may not be as problematic under Corwin, since these deals 
are unlikely to face further equity-holder damage claims. However, the
Corwin decision would be problematic if arbitrageurs target risky deals
as well. To address this question we next explore the determinants for 
merger arbitrage activity.
Table 3: Change in Shareholder Composition 
This Table reports the change in institutional investor composition around merger 
announcements. Shareholder composition is measured as a percentage (%) of all 
institutional investors. Panel A compares ownership measures from 13(f) filings in 
the preceding quarter Q-1 to those in the quarter Q immediately following the 
announcement. Panel B compares ownership in the preceding quarter Q-1 to those
at the end of the merger Q+T, whether completed or withdrawn. We classify
investors as short-term if turnover is greater than 1, medium-term if between 0.33 
and 1, and long-term if lower than 0.33. Final sample contains 852 mergers from 
2000 to 2015 with at least 50 institutional investors. 
Change in Shareholder Composition 
(% of Institutional Investor Ownership)
Category Mean SD Min 0.25 0.75 Max 
Panel A:
One Quarter Change: 
Q-1 to Q
Short-Term 11.22 9.95 -14.23 4.15 17.51 50.44 
Med.-Term -8.08 10.10 -45.66 -13.80 -1.69 31.92 
Long-Term -3.14 8.06 -37.57 -6.98 1.81 30.17 
Hedge Funds 9.82 10.17 -33.72 2.90 15.79 58.31 
IB and 
Brokerage 1.14 3.22 -26.48 -0.26 2.39 25.38 
Asset 
Management -5.97 8.17 -50.73 -10.10 -0.81 17.50 
Mutual Funds -4.19 6.78 -34.29 -7.68 -0.01 31.95 
Fin. Arms of 
Corps -0.02 0.26 -4.78 -0.01 0.00 3.35 
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Other 0.15 0.78 -5.27 -0.01 0.16 10.80 
Insurance 
Companies -0.79 2.07 -16.36 -1.16 0.09 10.16 
Banks and 
Trusts -0.59 4.45 -20.01 -2.60 1.78 28.58 
Endowments 0.22 1.24 -2.70 0.00 0.07 26.38 
Pension 
Funds 0.25 1.39 -12.07 -0.36 0.79 6.40 
Panel B: 
Merger End Change: 
Q-1 to Q+T
Short-Term 13.50 11.16 -17.32 5.24 20.61 50.44 
Med.-Term -9.63 11.49 -56.17 -16.86 -2.22 23.71 
Long-Term -3.87 9.13 -51.38 -8.69 1.72 30.29 
Hedge Funds 11.96 11.21 -33.93 4.33 18.30 58.31 
IB and 
Brokerage 1.41 3.71 -26.48 -0.28 2.77 32.38 
Asset 
Management -7.20 8.86 -58.90 -11.56 -1.64 18.07 
Mutual Funds -5.03 7.71 -39.05 -9.47 -0.07 29.89 
Fin. Arms of 
Corps -0.06 0.43 -4.53 -0.04 0.01 1.38 
Other 0.15 0.85 -6.39 -0.03 0.20 10.80 
Insurance 
Companies -1.01 2.30 -16.36 -1.50 0.06 10.16 
Banks and 
Trusts -0.70 5.15 -29.84 -2.96 1.92 28.58 
Endowments 0.16 0.68 -1.95 0.00 0.12 7.07 
Pension 
Funds 0.18 1.47 -12.09 -0.49 0.78 5.70 
In general terms, a merger arbitrageur’s objective is to capture the
risk premium—the spread between the bid price and the 
postannouncement market stock price—while minimizing the risk of a
costly failing merger. Similar to other insurance markets, the risk that 
the merger will not succeed is reflected in the spread—the difference 
between the market price at which the security is purchased and the 
ultimate payment received when the deal is consummated—which is 
the compensation paid to arbitrageurs for taking on the noncompletion 
risk. As a classic risk–return proposition, merger arbitrageurs may 
avoid deals with certain characteristics as the risks associated with the 
expected payout at a deal’s conclusions are too great for the rewards 
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of undertaking the arbitrage transaction.252 Table 4 sets forth several
variables that impact the arbitrageurs’ assessment of the risks posed by 
merger transactions 
Table 4: Short-Term Ownership Changes and Deal Characteristics 
This Table reports the change in short-term ownership and spread conditioning on
several merger characteristics. Spread is calculated as the percentage increase in the bid 
price over the target’s stock price one day after the announcement. “Duration” is the 
number of quarters the merger process takes from announcement to conclusion;
“Outcome” is either a successful merger with shareholder approval or a withdrawn 
proposal; “Consideration” is separated into cash, shares, and other types; Management 
Buyout (“MBO”) are mergers where management participated as the acquiring party;
“Competing Bids” represents mergers with competing bids; “Attitude” describes 
whether the merger is hostile or friendly; finally, “Appraisal” indicates if an appraisal 
was petitioned. Both the One-Quarter change and End-Date change are with respect to 
the pre-announcement quarter. “Diff” columns show the difference in coefficients along
with the statistical significance of a t-test. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. 
  in ST Ownership
Category No. (% of Institutional Investor Ownership) Spread (%) 
Deals One-Quarter End-Date 
Change Diff Change Diff Change Diff
Outcome 
Completed 773 11.64 — 13.86 — 6.14 — 
- -
Withdrawn 79 7.12 5.52*** 9.97 3.88*** 10.87 4.73***
Duration
1   388 12.55 — 12.55 — 7.07 — 
-
2 303 9.59 2.05*** 13.57 1.02 5.80 -1.26
- -
3 or more 161 9.37 3.17*** 15.63 3.09*** 6.85 -0.21
Consideration 
Cash 431 12.6 — 14.95 — 4.73 — 
- -
Shares 176 7.39 4.83*** 9.03 5.91*** 11.42 6.69***
Hybrid / 
Other 245 11.53 -0.44 14.16 -0.78 6.36 1.63*
Self-Dealing 
Transaction 
No 668 11.59 — 13.96 — 7.01 — 
Yes 184 9.88 -1.71** 11.84 -2.12** 4.69 -2.4**
252. John Paulson, The “Risk” in Risk Arbitrage, in MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK: FROM
THE SEAT OF THE PRACTITIONER – VIEWS FROM INVESTORS, COUNTERPARTIES, HEDGE FUNDS
AND CONSULTANTS 189, 190–98 (Virginia Reynolds Parker ed., 2000).
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
       
     
      
         
    
      
 
 
        
    
      
         
    
        
568 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
Management
Buyout 
No 834 11.32 — 13.52 — 6.93 — 
Yes 18 6.64 -4.68** 12.31 -1.21 7.75 0.823
Competing 
Bids
No 793 11.17 — 13.38 — 6.18 — 
Yes 59 11.93 0.66 15.09 1.71 11.96 5.77***
Attitude 
Friendly 849 11.23 — 13.49 — 6.50 — 
Hostile 3 7.62 -3.61 14.17 0.68 29.84 23.34***
Appraisal
No 835 11.23 — 13.50 — 6.66 — 
Yes 17 10.62 -0.61 13.31 -0.19 3.01 -3.64
Table 4 shows related mean statistics for short-term ownership
changes conditioned on various deal characteristics and outcomes. The 
last column of the table also shows the average bid spread, defined as 
the percentage increase of the bid price from market price before the
announcement. We see that overall the average percentage of deal
completion is 91 percent in our sample. Several other very interesting
results merit discussion.
First, on average, the change in short-term ownership is greater in
successful deals—11.64 percent for one quarter; 13.69 percent for end-
date—than in withdrawn ones—7.12 percent for one quarter; 9.97 
percent for end-date. This speaks to the ability of hedge funds to
distinguish between deals as well as to the possible impact that 
arbitrageurs have on merger outcomes. Additionally, the spread is 
significantly lower for successful deals—6.14 percent for successful
deals versus 10.87 percent for unsuccessful ones—implying that riskier 
deals are in fact priced as such. Secondly, we see that longer deals tend
to attract fewer arbitrageurs right after the deal is announced as shown 
by the one-quarter change—12.55 percent for short deals against 9.37 
percent for longer ones—but short-term investors significantly 
increase their ownership as time goes by or as the merger nears 
completion, increasing from 9.37 percent in the one-quarter change to 
15.63 percent by end-date.
Other conditioning variables are deal characteristics. Both self-
dealing transactions253 and management buyouts are known to pose
253. A self-dealing transaction is defined as a deal where the acquirer has a toehold greater
than 5 percent in the target or the company is to be taken private.
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higher risks of management wrongdoing,254 and these seem to have 
smaller increases in short-term investors. These results are consistent
with the idea that merger arbitrageurs are not willing to take on this
type of high risk, especially given the lack of reward in higher spreads. 
The fact that the short-term investors identified are reluctant to hold 
shares of firms in self-dealing mergers with low spreads is further 
indication that they are merger arbitrageurs, and not appraisal 
arbitrageurs, because the latter group seeks to make profits by 
litigating over possible conflicts of interest while the former seeks to 
profit from the price spread.
The type of consideration received upon a deal’s conclusion is
another important determinant of arbitrage activity. Arbitrageurs face 
an additional risk in noncash mergers because stock lacks a fixed 
consideration value, and the merger arbitrageurs cannot ensure a 
positive spread profit between the postannouncement buy-in date and
the time of completion.255 If the stock market were to perform poorly 
during the merger process, they could lose money even if the merger 
was successful.256 Table 4 reflects that this risk implies a larger increase
of short-term ownership as well as lower spread for cash deals. Finally, 
Table 4 also presents statistics on deals with multiple competing bids 
and merger attitude—that is, whether the deal is hostile or friendly. 
Competing bids can result in larger bid premia and bid improvements.  
Merger arbitrage is not the only strategy hedge funds can employ 
during mergers. Some hedge funds have recently engaged in appraisal 
arbitrage, whereby they target mergers with possible conflicts of 
interest to petition an appraisal and possibly litigate.257 Clearly, an 
appraisal-arbitrage strategy would have significantly different effects 
on corporate outcomes since their strategy consists of voting against
the merger. The last conditioning variable in Table 4 is whether a fund
petitioned for an appraisal of the fair value of the shares. As Table 4
shows, there are relatively few appraisal-arbitrage cases in our 
sample—twenty-eight, to be exact—and appraisal does not appear to
be correlated with a statistically significant larger increase in short-
term ownership. This implies that the changes in short-term ownership
254. Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or
Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 699 & n.2 (2016). 
255. Paulson, supra note 252, at 195.
256. For this reason, in stock deals, it is common for arbitrageurs to also short the acquirer’s
stock and lock in a spread. However, this is not a possible strategy for every merger arbitrageur
and poses other risks. See id. at 191.
257. Jiang et al., supra note 254, at 698.
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identified in our sample are more consistent with merger arbitrage 
rather than with appraisal arbitrage. In fact, that short-term investors 
are reluctant to hold shares of firms in self-dealing mergers with low
spreads is an indication that they are merger arbitrageurs, and not
appraisal arbitrageurs, because the latter group seeks to make profits 
by litigating over possible conflicts of interest while the former seeks
to profit from the price spread.
Although the mean statistics in Table 4 speak to several different 
results, they do not consider possible correlations between firm, deal 
characteristics, and short-term ownership changes. To study 
determinants for the change in ownership around merger 
announcement and address this concern, we need to regress ownership
changes on these variables. Through use of regression techniques, we
seek to understand in which cases we should expect higher arbitrageur 
participation, as this would highlight when other investors choose to
sell-out and not to vote on the merger. On the one hand, if merger 
arbitrageurs offer insurance against possible deal breakdowns and 
large downfalls in prices, then we should expect larger changes in 
ownership around risky deals and those with higher bid premia over 
previous market prices. On the other hand, arbitrageurs may also avoid 
deals with poor prospects if they are unlikely to succeed and will shy 
away from having to participate as activists engaging in manager-
monitoring behavior.
Table 5 shows estimates for regressions of the change in
institutional ownership on a variety of independent variables, including 
the target firm’s characteristics and deal characteristics. The dependent
variable in the first three columns is the one-quarter change in
ownership, while in the last three columns it is the change to the last 
quarter of the merger.258 Among the firm characteristics, market
capitalization is an important determinant in the first quarter of the 
deal possibly because it is easier to coordinate strategies with other 
short-term investors at larger firms.  
Deal characteristics appear to be important determinants of 
merger arbitrage activity. Our results suggest that self-dealing 
transactions, and to a lesser extent management buy-outs, discourage
short-term investors from holding target stocks during mergers. This 
result is somewhat puzzling, given that these types of mergers involve 
a higher risk of failure, but the greater risk is not matched by a larger 
258. Additionally, all regressions include year fixed effects to account for varying market
conditions and other time effects.
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spread as shown in Table 4. The type of consideration to effect the
merger is another important determinant of arbitrage activity. Cash 
deals are associated with increases in short-term ownership relative to 
stock and hybrid deals.
Finally, the offer premium, defined as the spread between the 
offered merger price and the pre-announcement market price, is also 
an important determinant. An increase of one percentage point in the
offer premium is associated with a five-basis-point increase in short-
term investor ownership. 
Table 5: Determinants of Change in Stock Ownership 
This Table reports estimates from regressing changes in ownership composition as a 
percentage of institutional investors on firm and deal characteristics. The dependent 
variables in the first three columns are one-quarter changes (“Q-1 to QI”) for short-term 
(“ST”), medium-term (“MT”) and long-term (“LT”) investors, respectively. In the last 
three columns, it is merger-end changes (“Q-1 to Q+T”) for short-term (“ST”), medium-
term (“MT”) and long-term (“LT”) investors. The target firm characteristics are market 
capitalization (“MV”), book-to-market (“B/M”), leverage ratio, dividend yield, revenue 
growth, past year stock market growth relative to industry average, the logarithm of 
traded volume, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).
Dep. 
Variable   in Ownership (% of Institutional Investors)
Q-1 to Q Q-1 to End of Merger 
ST MT LT ST MT LT
MV -0.752*** 0.747*** 0.00563 -0.304 0.676** -0.372
(-2.94) (2.88) (0.02) (-1.01) (2.22) (-1.45)
B/M -2.139** 1.444 0.695 -2.261** 1.849* 0.412
(-2.46) (1.62) (0.88) (-2.47) (1.85) (0.50)
Leverage 0.0493 0.0414 -0.0907 0.133 0.0294 -0.163*
(0.59) (0.47) (-1.17) (1.56) (0.30) (-1.89)
Div. Yield -8.336** 3.803 4.533 -11.15** 7.073 4.075
(-2.10) (0.87) (1.08) (-2.58) (1.40) (1.03)
Rev. Growth -0.0255 -0.0485 0.0740 -0.196 0.128 0.0675
(-0.04) (-0.06) (0.15) (-0.24) (0.13) (0.13)
Past Stk
Return 0.277 0.278 -0.555*** 0.323 0.105 -0.428**
(1.05) (1.26) (-3.25) (0.96) (0.36) (-2.04)
Volume 0.686 -2.009*** 1.324*** 0.556 -2.103*** 1.547***
(1.54) (-4.66) (3.54) (1.13) (-4.18) (3.68)
HHI 1.162 -0.418 -0.744 -0.183 -1.009 1.191
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(0.28) (-0.10) (-0.23) (-0.04) (-0.21) (0.30)
Self-Dealing -2.666*** 3.127*** -0.461 -3.533*** 3.406*** 0.127
(-2.81) (3.28) (-0.63) (-3.44) (3.28) (0.16)
MBO -3.690* 3.048 0.642 0.511 -0.381 -0.130
(-1.80) (1.56) (0.48) (0.21) (-0.16) (-0.08)
Hostile -7.007** 3.744 3.263* -3.612 2.038 1.574
(-2.27) (1.27) (1.94) (-0.57) (0.45) (0.61)
Cash 2.211*** -2.485*** 0.274 2.782*** -2.877*** 0.0943
(2.72) (-3.04) (0.43) (3.01) (-3.11) (0.13)
Competing
Bids 1.710 -1.158 -0.552 2.937* -1.995 -0.942
(1.21) (-0.87) (-0.52) (1.73) (-1.18) (-0.79)
Bid 
Premium 5.374*** -3.412** -1.962 5.657*** -2.756 -2.901**
(3.43) (-2.27) (-1.60) (3.20) (-1.52) (-2.09)
Constant 9.201*** -9.261*** 0.0601 8.296*** -11.79*** 3.499
(3.76) (-3.46) (0.03) (2.77) (-3.60) (1.42)
R-squared 0.130 0.132 0.136 0.107 0.124 0.142
Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852
C. Effects on Merger Outcomes
Large ownership shifts pose a problem under Corwin because, 
ultimately, voting does not reflect the same deal-approval preference 
to that of the original shareholders. Since merger arbitrageurs can be
expected to vote in favor of deals in light of their substantial investment 
being riveted to the value of the end-of-deal consideration, the large 
shift in ownership we observe can be decisive in determining the 
outcome of a deal. Moreover, since high share turnover is observable 
and signals merger arbitrage activity, other investors may feel this 
thumb on the scale and decide to support the deal rather than vote 
against it. 
What is the projected effect of these ownership shifts on the 
likelihood of merger completion? In Table 6, we set forth data that 
enables us to assess the impact of changes in institutional ownership 
during M&A events and merger outcomes. Specifically, we present 
evidence that merger arbitrageur activity is associated with a higher 
likelihood for merger success in deals where shareholder approval is 
decisive. 
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Table 6: Merger Outcomes 
This Table reports estimates of a probit model for merger success. In both 
regressions, the dependent variable is 1 if the merger was successful and 0
otherwise. The variable of interest in the first regression is the change in short-term 
ownership (“ ST”). The second regression uses a Top 20% to indicate if ST is in 
the top quintile, and a Bottom 20% dummy to indicate if  ST is in the bottom
quintile. The “dPr/dX” columns show the marginal effects on merger success 
probability of a unit change (or 100 basis points) in each regressor. 
Dep. Variable: Success=1 Success=1 
Probit dPr/dX Probit dPr/dX 
 ST (%) 0.0268*** 0.30% 
(3.61) 
Top 20% 0.648** 2.48% 
(2.51) 
Bottom 20% -0.0794 -5.32% 
(-0.50) 
Spread (%) -0.870** -0.11% -0.820** -0.09% 
(-2.45) (-2.28) 
MV 0.0912* 1.02% 0.0916* 1.03% 
(1.74) (1.74) 
B/M 0.0713 0.80% 0.0813 0.92% 
(0.39) (0.43) 
Leverage -0.00850 -0.10% -0.00818 -0.09% 
(-0.51) (-0.48) 
Div. Yield -0.632 -7.10% -0.809 -9.13% 
(-0.79) (-0.98) 
Rev. Growth -0.323*** -3.63% -0.326*** -3.68% 
(-2.76) (-2.84) 
Past Stk 
Return 0.00880 0.10% 0.00826 0.09% 
(0.20) (0.19) 
Volume -0.0671 -0.75% -0.0880 -0.99% 
(-0.73) (-0.94) 
-HHI -1.039 -11.67% -1.109 
12.52% 
(-1.56) (-1.63) 
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Self-Dealing -0.424** -4.76% -0.433** -4.89% 
(-2.11) (-2.14) 
MBO -0.210 -2.36% -0.305 -3.44% 
(-0.52) (-0.75) 
-
Hostile -0.793 -8.91% -0.954 10.76% 
(-1.26) (-1.50) 
Cash 0.176 1.98% 0.188 2.12% 
(1.04) (1.09) 
Competing
Bids
-1.714*** -19.25% -1.721*** -
19.42% 
(-7.96) (-7.88) 
Constant 1.078** 1.182** 
(2.27) (2.46) 
R-squared 0.258 0.254 
Observations 839 839 
Unlike the sample used in previous tables, this analysis excludes 
mergers that failed on regulatory grounds. Merger deals are usually 
subject to regulatory approval intended to prevent anticompetitive 
transactions, but such reviews can lead to deal failures regardless of 
shareholder composition or investor support.259 In fact, out of seventy-
nine failures in our original sample, we identify ten regulatory failures 
that correspond with an increase in short-term ownership that was 6.7 
percentage points lower than in other failures. It would be imprudent 
to claim that these ten deals failed because of less arbitrage activity. 
Table 6 shows estimates of a probit model of merger success 
likelihood, highlighting the importance of shareholder changes.260 The 
main variable of interest is the one-quarter change in short-term 
ownership (“ ST”), which captures the amount of merger arbitrage 
participation, while the remaining variables are covariates that can also 
affect success likelihood. In the first regression, the coefficient on  ST
shows evidence of the importance of merger arbitrage and the second
column presents the marginal effects (“dPr/dx”), which allows us to
259. Data on regulatory failures were provided by Morgan Ricks (Vanderbilt Law School).
260. Probit regressions estimate binary dependent variables models, such as merger success,
by fitting a gaussian cumulative distribution. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 457–59 (2002) for an in-depth description of
probit and other binary response models.
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interpret the economic significance of our results. We previously 
showed in Table 4 that 91 percent of the deals in our sample were 
successfully completed—in line with previous estimates of the 
unconditional average probability of success.261 And in Panel B of 
Table 3, we showed that the average one-quarter change in short-term 
ownership is 11.2 percentage points. In terms of the marginal effects, a 
one-percentage-point increase in short-term ownership is associated
with a 0.30 percentage-point increase in merger success from an 
unconditional average probability of 91 percent. Thus, if we
extrapolate linearly then the average merger arbitrage activity changes 
merger likelihood by 3.4 percent (0.30 x 11.2 percent), which can be
interpreted to mean that increased merger arbitrage has a statistically
significant positive effect on deal completion. As an additional 
example, a deal without any increase in short-term ownership
(“ ST=0”) corresponds with a 87.6 percent likelihood of completion,262 
while a deal with a 10 percentage point—one standard deviation— 
higher-than-average arbitrageur participation corresponds with a 94 
percent likelihood of completion. In other words, the risk of deal 
noncompletion drops from 12.4 percent to 6 percent, or by over 50 
percent, when short-term ownership increases this much.
There are two different interpretations for the relationship 
between deal success and increases in short-term ownership. The first
suggests arbitrageurs might simply consider the riskiness of deals and
avoid those most likely to fail. However, this regression includes the
postannouncement spread—the deal price over stock market price— 
as well as deal and firm characteristics, to control for possible sources
of risk that may correlate with arbitrage activity. In fact, as expected, a
higher spread does predict a higher likelihood of failure, confirming
that arbitrageurs demand a higher compensation to buy shares in
riskier deals. But most importantly, by controlling for these variables, 
the coefficient on the change in short-term ownership is not capturing 
risks that arbitrageurs price-in. Rather, we interpret this result as 
evidence in favor of the second interpretation: that short-term 
investors push for the deal’s completion by voting in favor of the 
transaction.263 
261. Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 228, at 618–19. 
262. The likelihood of completion without any increase in short-term ownership is calculated
as follows: 91 – (0.30 x 11.2) = 87.6.
263. Hsieh and Walkling reach a similar conclusion in their study. Cf. Hsieh & Walkling, supra
note 228, at 642.
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In addition, we shed light on a few other results on the relationship 
between deal characteristics and merger outcomes. For instance, self-
dealing transactions lower the likelihood of deal success as these
transactions are more often challenged by other stakeholders.
Consideration also seems to matter: cash deals have a higher likelihood 
of merger completion. Of course, if a deal is challenged by a competing 
bid, then subsequent bids are generally higher and more frequent. 
Tautologically, then, if there are competing bids, the likelihood that 
any one deal is successful is lower.  
To examine more closely the impact of the shift of shares into 
short-term holders’ hands, we next examine those transactions with the 
highest and the lowest percentage changes in stock ownership. For 
example, when we look at the twenty deals with the greatest shifts, we
find that they show a percentage shift to short-term investors ranging 
from approximately 40 percent to over 50 percent of all shares held by 
institutional investors. Not surprisingly, all of these twenty transactions
obtained shareholder approval.
To get a more sophisticated view of these effects, in the second 
regression of Table 6 we break out the cases with the highest twenty
percentage shifts (“Top 20%”) and the lowest twenty percentage shifts 
(“Bottom 20%”) and then rerun the regression in Table 6. By 
examining the coefficients of these two variables, we should be able to
discern the impact on merger success of high and low shifts in short-
term investor holdings. 
The signs on the coefficients of both variables confirm our result, 
but only the Top 20 percent coefficient is statistically significant. It can 
be interpreted as evidence that in those mergers with large changes in
shares from long-term holders into the hands of merger arbitrageurs, 
the risk of merger failure is higher by 2.8 percentage points than the 
average merger, whereas for the Bottom 20 percent there is an
insignificant decrease of 2.7 percentage points relative to the average
success rate.
While these overall percentage changes appear relatively small, it
is important to remember Listokin’s findings that “management wins 
the close ones.”264 As we saw in Table 6, the percentage shift out of the 
hands of long-term holders and into those of short-term merger 
arbitrageurs has important effects on merger completion rates. Even
264. Listokin, supra note 28. 
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small percentage shifts will enable corporate managers to push through 
shareholder votes to gain merger approvals. 
VI. RECONSIDERING SELF-DEALING TRANSACTIONS
The data and analysis in the preceding Part challenge a key
mechanism corporate law has long embraced for addressing one of the
most prevalent issues that arise in corporations: self-dealing 
transactions. In its most basic form, self-dealing arises when directors,
officers, or controlling stockholders directly or indirectly enter into 
contracts or transactions with a corporation in which they serve as a 
director, officer, or controlling shareholder.265 All states now have 
conflict-of-interest statutes that address contracts or transactions in 
which a corporation’s director or officer has such an interest.266 Even 
beyond the state conflict of interest statutes, control stockholder self-
dealing, although not the subject of such statutes, follows an analogous 
course to that provided by statute for director and officer self-
dealing.267 
In broad overview, self-dealing by any fiduciary results in that 
person having the burden of establishing the contract or transaction’s 
fairness. This inquiry generally focuses on whether the deal bears the 
indicia of an arms-length transaction, so reviewing courts consider the 
265. “Self-dealing” as used here is narrower than “conflict of interest” or bad faith as self-
dealing covers transactions in which the fiduciary is either in privity of contract with the 
corporation or has a fiduciary or financial interest in an entity that is in privity with the 
corporation. Thus, we do not intend the expression self-dealing to include the broader range of
duty of loyalty violations by officers or directors or for that matter oppressive or unfair behavior 
by a controlling party. See, e.g., Kern v. Arlington Ridge Pathology, S.C., 893 N.E.2d 999, 1008
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (holding there to be no self-dealing involved when shareholder-directors vote
to amend the company’s articles of incorporation so that it provides greater flexibility for them to
later increase their control of the firm). See generally 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, §§ 10.11–.12
(distinguishing absence of good faith from self-dealing); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors
Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (providing close
analysis of cases whereby in a few decades courts and legislatures moved from deeming self-
dealing transactions voidable to upholding transactions if they were fair or impartially approved).
 266. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2018);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016).
 267. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994)
(“[A]pproval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed
majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the 
controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”).
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price as compared to market value,268 the level of disclosure
surrounding the matter,269 and whether the transaction was the product 
of negotiations by independent parties.270 The breadth of such a
fairness inquiry, when coupled with the fact that the conflicted party 
has the burden of proof, is daunting, and all the more so if there is also 
fear that this inquiry may be plagued by hindsight bias.271 Statutory 
provisions and common law doctrine have created two alternatives to
the blunderbuss fairness inquiry: good-faith independent ratification 
by either independent directors or the disinterested shareholders.272 
When such impartial approval occurs, courts regularly conclude that 
the adverse inference that arose solely because of the demonstrated
self-dealing by the director, officer, or controlling stockholder 
disappears, such that the contract thereafter is viewed as any other 
business transaction arrived at in good faith and at arm’s length.273 That
is, independent-director or shareholder approval restores the
presumption of the business judgment rule so that anyone questioning 
268. See, e.g., Kim v. Grover C. Coors Tr., 179 P.3d 86, 92 (Colo. App. 2007); Johnson v.
Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 513, 521–22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Straight v. Goss, 678 S.E.2d 443, 452– 
54 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009).
 269. See, e.g., Kim, 179 P.3d at 93–94; Dynan v. Fritz, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1378 (Mass. 1987);
State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 984 (Wash. 1964) (equating
nondisclosure with inherent unfairness). 
270. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991) (emphasizing lengthy bargaining, 
transaction priced at midpoint of each party’s position, and absence of viable alternatives).
271. For a discussion of how hindsight bias impacts the content of fiduciary duties in the
corporate setting, see EISENBERG & COX, supra note 217, at 625–27 (explaining how more than
ordinary negligence is required for breach of care in corporate setting out of concern that
hindsight bias otherwise may impose liability for justifiable risk taking by managers; however,
with loyalty violations, such as self-dealing, second guessing in light of post-transaction events
remains a possibility). 
272. There is an academic debate over whether these measures are necessary or value
maximizing. See generally Alessio M. Pacces, Procedural and Substantive Review of Related Party
Transactions: The Case for Noncontrolling Shareholder-Dependent Directors, in THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, supra note 25, at 181 (arguing that minority-
elected directors are the most efficient method of monitoring value decreasing related party 
transactions); Rock, supra note 25 (arguing that majority of minority votes do not greatly harm
nor greatly benefit minority shareholders); Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural
Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence of the Effect of MFW (Mar.
5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3105169 [https://perma.cc/PH6N-
JSZA] (arguing that the MFW legal standard provides a net benefit to minority shareholders in
squeezeout transactions).
 273. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1266 (Conn. 1994); Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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that transaction has the burden of proof that the approving parties 
acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent.274 
We do not believe that the empirical evidence and reasons
developed above necessarily cause the contemporary approach to self-
dealing to be reconsidered; they do call for clarification of what such 
approval does not mean, at least with respect to state conflict-of-
interest statutes. As first developed, state conflict-of-interest statutes 
sought to change prevailing judicial avoidance of contracts or
transactions when there was evidence that the contract directly or 
indirectly involved a director or officer. By the time the first conflict-
of-interest statute was enacted, the modern cases had already moved 
beyond automatic avoidance and upheld deals if they were shown to
be fair and independently approved. Initially, conflict-of-interest 
statutes embraced this modern approach, but generally, they were not 
regulatory. In the intervening decades, a good deal of uncertainty 
surrounds just what effect should be accorded impartial director or 
shareholder approval.275 
This Article strongly counsels that courts should not be indifferent
to whether self-dealing was approved by the directors or the 
shareholders because the individual contexts behind these decisions 
are vastly unique. Of the two, the directors are, on paper, in the better 
position to protect the corporate interest when addressing self-dealing.
Among the advantages that the board enjoys is better access to 
information and capabilities to evaluate information. This advantage 
exists for three main reasons. First, board members are the 
quintessential insiders with knowledge of information not readily
available to the general public. Second, the board does not have the 
collective action problems that shareholders do; directors not only 
engage easily among themselves, but also, more importantly, they are 
better able to deliberate about the transaction with greater depth than
shareholders, who have no means to probe more deeply than the proxy 
statement. Finally, directors enjoy the power of the purse as they can 
274. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 875 F.2d 549, 552–53 (6th
Cir. 1989); Rosenfield, 643 A.2d at 1266. 
275. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts To Curtail the Fiduciary 
Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 385–90 (1988)
(closely reviewing the 1988 amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act that effectively 
removed from any scrutiny transactions that are independently approved); Marsh, supra note 265
(providing the classic discussion of how the common law’s early approach to conflict of interest 
quickly morphed from automatic avoidance of self-dealing transactions to inquiries into the 
challenged transaction’s fairness). 
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deploy corporate funds to retain advisors and others to enable them to 
make a truly informed decision. 
As seen earlier, many shares are held by financial institutions, who
can have their own conflicts of interest that influence their ratification
decision and who, importantly, face no fiduciary obligation when 
voting that serves to regulate any conflict they have. By contrast, 
directors, whose vote can serve as a ratifying vote as a threshold matter, 
are independent of the underlying contract or transaction and are 
subject to fiduciary obligations in their review and approval of the self-
dealing transaction. Independent directors, when asked to approve a 
self-dealing transaction, do not face a bird-in-the-hand situation of the 
type discussed in the Introduction, which appears to dwarf the 
heuristics that guide even sophisticated hedge funds in supporting a 
majority of the minority votes in self-dealing mergers. Shareholders
can naturally understand that withholding approval means no 
transaction, whereas the independent directors generally enjoy the 
position to negotiate a better outcome. That freedom also disconnects 
the underlying self-dealing conduct from the contract or transaction;
that is, a self-dealing contract or transaction submitted to the board of 
directors is not bundled in the same way that resolutions presented to 
the shareholders might be. Because the boardroom is a forum for 
deliberation, it allows boards to withhold approval while negotiating 
for improved terms. Further leverage exists for the board, as it is able 
to qualify its approval with an articulation that it is only authorizing the
contract or transaction and not necessarily affirming the fiduciary’s 
conduct. 
The above are a few of the reasons why approval by the board of 
directors and the shareholders, in light of the data and analysis 
developed in this paper, should be treated very differently. We do not 
quibble with the contemporary view that a self-dealing transaction that 
is the product of a fully informed impartial vote of the directors should
be reviewed differently than if that transaction had no impartial 
approval. This seems supported by logic and is likely legislatively 
compelled by state conflict-of-interest statutes, which provide three 
separate alternative mechanisms for upholding self-dealing 
transactions. First, a transaction could pass a fairness inquiry. Second, 
the transaction could be approved by the impartial directors. Third, the 
transaction could be approved by the shareholders. Importantly, the 
latter two avenues do not have to pass the fairness requirement.
Impartial approval must have some benefit over a fairness inquiry. 
How should the approval by the weaker impartial body—the
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shareholders—be treated differently from the approval by the board of 
directors? The necessary predicates for shareholder approval to
cleanse a matter is that their approval must come after full disclosure
and not be coerced.276 Consistent with the operation of conflict-of-
interest statutes, the burden of proof for each of these should be on the 
party who seeks to invoke the cleansing effect of the shareholder vote.
The analysis in this Article supports the view that at least in the case of 
alleged ratification by the shareholders, the inquiry into each of these 
predicate requirements should be more sweeping than it has been.
Even though the absence of coercion is the sine qua non for 
shareholder approval, our analysis and data demonstrate that the
courts have been woefully narrow in what they hold to be coercion. As 
discussed earlier, Liberty Broadband did hold that directly bundling 
negative- and positive-value outcomes into connected resolutions 
caused coercion, such that the shareholders’ ultimate approval did not 
cleanse the misconduct. Our Article makes the case that shareholder 
approval of merger transactions offering a premium of any amount 
above the pre-announced market price is inherently coercive. This 
explains why Professor Rock’s study of MOM transactions found no 
instance in which shareholders withheld their approval.277 Our data in
Part V show that substantial ownership changes among institutional 
investors occurs in the quarter the deal is announced, so that these new
owners are committed to approving the deal by the investment they 
have already made. Thus, when the proxy statement later discloses 
details indicating possible unfairness—or worse, management laxity or
conflicts—the vote by the arriving owners is hardly free of financial 
duress. From our perspective, coercion should, at least in the case of 
shareholder ratification, be much more sweeping than classic bundling
considerations. 
Likewise, a court’s inquiry into whether material facts were 
disclosed should be more inclusive than in the case of the board of 
directors. As seen earlier, directors, whether on the full board or a 
committee of the board, have a chance to interact with the transaction 
and its supporters. Shareholders acting only through the proxy 
mechanisms do not. This distinction implicates both what needs to be
disclosed and how the disclosed information is presented. Certainly 
more than a neutral narrative of the transaction’s terms, such as
occurred in the proxy statement at the heart of Corwin, is needed. 
276. See supra Part IV.A. 
277. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 4:50 PM        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
582 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:503
There is no easy template for what is to be disclosed and how disclosure
should be made. Perhaps instructively, in self-dealing transactions, the 
defendant bears the burden of disclosing, in an understandable 
manner, the facts necessary for the shareholder to excuse the self-
dealing. Minimally, companies should be required to make a detailed
and balanced disclosure of the ways in which the conflicted parties 
benefit from the transaction, presenting the potential legal and
financial arguments bearing on whether misconduct has occurred and 
indicating whether the transaction is in the interest of the company or 
its shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate statutes condition significant corporate transactions on 
shareholder approval. This is an important mechanism for protecting 
shareholders. While we champion the voice of the shareholder in votes 
and in corporate governance issues, for the reasons we develop in this 
Article, we believe that the shareholder vote is deeply qualified. Thus, 
at a time when ownership of public companies is increasingly 
concentrated in financial institutions, providing a basis for courts and 
commentators to call for curbing protective features of corporate law, 
we caution judges and academics that the time is not yet at hand for 
such a laissez faire approach. Shareholders, even large, well-financed 
hedge funds, face too many forces that limit their ability to single out 
managers for misconduct in a transaction that the shareholders are 
asked to approve. As developed here, their voice in approving the
transaction, even one separately identified as involving self-dealing,
should be understood as only approving the transaction itself and not 
the conduct that preceded it. 
